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Abstract
Quillivan, Rebecca. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2020. Just Culture in
healthcare error management: Nurse-in-training view of Just Culture and outcomes of
event involvement. Major Professor: Frank Andrasik, Ph.D.
This experimental study assessed the behavioral and psychosocial effects of just
culture error management strategies for medical errors in a healthcare setting, and the
outcomes of such strategies on work-related perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. A total
of 247 nurses-in-training were randomly assigned to one of 6 experimental conditions. In
each condition, participants read a vignette that described an “at-risk” medical error and
the error management strategy employed by a hypothetical organization. The medical
error was written to implicate both the individual involved, and the larger organizational
system. Vignettes differed with regard to error management strategy employed by the
organization (punitive, blameless, just culture) and the degree of event severity (no harm,
harm). Participants rated the organizational justice and trustworthiness of the hypothetical
organization described in the vignette; then, reported their own willingness to engage in
safety compliance and error reporting behaviors and their degree of organizational
commitment and attraction.
Error management strategies based in just culture were associated with increased
perceptions of organizational justice and trustworthiness, increased intention to engage in
safety compliance, and stronger attraction and commitment to the organization.
Furthermore, perceptions about the organizational justice and organizational trust
mediated the relationship between error management strategy and these outcomes. Event
severity did not moderate the association between error management and organizational
perceptions. Furthermore, error management strategy was unrelated to error reporting
intention. Control variables of familiarity with concepts of just culture, experience with
v

medical errors (as provider or patient), and demographic variables of gender and age
were not associated with organizational commitment, organizational attraction, or safety
compliance. However, error reporting intention was positively associated with familiarity
with concepts of just culture was positively and negatively associated with experience
with medical errors as a provider.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mistakes and errors are a part of every human endeavor – including performance
at work (Reason, 1990). In some high-risk industries (e.g., medicine, nuclear power,
aviation or rail transportation), even relatively minor errors can lead to devastating
outcomes (i.e., Chernobyl). In the healthcare field, when physicians, nurses, pharmacists,
and other front-line caregivers make even minor mistakes in the course of care patients
can face costly, permanent, or even fatal consequences (Kohn, 2001; James, 2013). These
mistakes may be as simple as a miscalculation during medication administration or
omissions in bedside care (such as, failure to turn immobile patients on schedule to
prevent bed sores); but may also occur in situations that require more complex reasoning
and deductive skills (such as, incorrect diagnoses and non-optimal treatment approaches).
Over the past decade, analyses have repeatedly revealed that hospitalized patients are
unnecessarily harmed at much higher rates than expected (Kohn 2001; Kohn, Corrigan et
al. 2000; Levinson & General 2010). In fact, estimates suggest that serious medical
mistakes occur in 21 percent of hospitalizations, and are the third leading cause of
fatalities, affecting approximately 1 out of every 6 deaths in the United States annually
(James, 2013). Given that roughly 87% of medical errors lead to additional treatment
requirements – further ancillary services, prescription drug services, and inpatient or
outpatient care, for instance (Milliman, 2010) – the total cost of medical errors in the
United States is posited to exceed $19.5 billion a year (Andel et al., 2012). Many of these
medical mistakes are preventable (James, 2013); meaning, the healthcare providers or
hospital system should and/or could have behaved differently to avoid any patient harm.
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As a result, managing the safety performance of frontline healthcare providers who are at
risk of being involved in medical mistakes and improving the safety of the healthcare
system, as a whole, is a significant priority for medical organizations aiming to reduce
their rates of preventable patient harm (Reason, 1990, 1995, 2000; Reason et al., 1990).
One approach to ensuring safety in healthcare and other high-risk industries is
through the adoption of employee performance management strategies known as error
management (Reason, 1998). Like other performance management techniques, error
management frequently involves applying proactive and reactive Behavioral intentionbased strategies (punishments and rewards) that focus on improving various dimensions
of frontline safety performance; in this case, safety-critical behaviors that ensure work is
done safely, mistakes and unsafe circumstances are quickly detected or reported, negative
consequences are effectively handled and minimized, and post-error learning occurs
(Frese, 2008; Frese & Keith, 2015). Traditionally, healthcare organizations relied on
punitive and disciplinary strategies to motivate safe behavior on the job (Reason, 1998),
but recent advancements in patient safety, human factors engineering, and error research
has encouraged high-risk organizations to take a more global, systemic approach to
addressing harm that results from human performance variability (Karsh et al., 2006). It
is now well-accepted that healthcare workers must perform their complex work within
the limits (and under the influence) of their social, physical, and hierarchical work
environments, and that these factors must be taken into account when adopting error
management techniques (Reason, 2000).
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Just Culture Error Management
Over the past decade, the most acclaimed approach to healthcare error
management is just culture (Reason, 1998, 2000). Just culture is a hierarchical, systemwide approach to safety wherein a hospital thoroughly examines the underlying causes of
errors, explicitly adopts a just framework of accountability for responding to medical
errors that extends across all levels of an organization, and applies interventionist tactics
accordingly. Fair accountability is accomplished by evaluating the extent to which
various inter-related forces within the organization contribute in producing the error.
Such forces may include the behavior and choices of frontline staff; decisions and
priorities of organizational leaders, managers, and supervisors; technologies and work
systems involved in providing care; and components of the physical and social
environment, such as distraction or social norms. This organization-wide examination of
root causes theoretically allows just culture to flexibly address the factors – both
personnel and systemic – that contribute to errors, and implement appropriate
countermeasures that can reduce their occurrence (Reason, 2000). The architect of just
culture, psychologist and error researcher James Reason, argues that just culture results in
an atmosphere of trust that is expected to make essential contributions to the
organization’s larger safety culture and performance (Reason, 1995).
Since its introduction to the patient safety literature in 2000 (Reason, 2000), just
culture error management has been widely adopted by patient safety advocates, error
researchers, medical associations, and patient safety organizations (PSOs) based
primarily on several key hypotheses. First, just culture is expected to encourage
employees to trust that the organization will not unfairly blame them for errors,
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increasing the likelihood staff will transparently discuss and share their errors and other
unsafe circumstances with the organization (e.g., event reporting), and will voluntarily
partner with organizations to fix safety flaws (e.g., safety citizenship behaviors; Reason,
2000). When disciplinary responses automatically follow error reports, incidents are seen
as something shameful, to be kept concealed, leading to the loss of much potential safety
information (Dekker, 2007). Secondly, it is posited that staff members working within an
environment of just culture will feel accountable for their safety behaviors; leading to
safer decisions on the job, such as increased adherence to best safety practices, rules, and
regulations (e.g., safety compliance). Thirdly, by emphasizing fairness in the aftermath of
errors, just culture is more likely to fulfill worker’s psychological needs for ethical and
just management; increasing positive work-related attitudes, such as improved morale,
commitment, and satisfaction. Finally, increases in safety compliance and enhanced
worker psychological states are expected to improve the overall safety of the organization
and reduce the likelihood errors will occur and harm patients (Reason, 2000). Therefore,
the core insight of just culture is that, by emphasizing fairness and accountability, error
management can improve the safety outcomes across the organization via more open
discussion and mitigation of safety risks and failures, safer worker behaviors, and
happier, motivated workers.
Despite significant theoretical discussions concerning the hypotheses of just
culture error management, several fundamental questions remain unresolved from an
empirical perspective. The preponderance of evidence for Just Culture’s efficacy has
relied upon descriptive analyses (for example: von Thaden et al., 2006; Waring, 2005)
and correlational, field experiments (for example: Butler, 2015; Connor et al., 2007)
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where extraneous variables may influence the results in unknown ways (Peterson et al.,
1982). Therefore, the causal relationships between the key safety-critical behaviors
(safety compliance, event reporting) and just culture techniques have not been
empirically validated. Secondly, it is not well understood whether just culture error
management techniques are indeed interpreted as “just” by the frontline staffers to which
they are applied; or whether various factors, such as outcome severity and demographic
variables, impinge upon these interpretations. It could be that demographic and errorspecific variables directly impact how error management techniques are perceived by
individuals, and therefore, should be added as control variables.
By extension, no empirical evidence links just culture techniques to staff trust –
the hypothesized mediating variable at the core of just culture approach. Finally, the
impact that just culture error management techniques have on other operational and
safety-relevant variables related to employee retention and satisfaction, such as
commitment to the organization, and attractiveness for employment have not been
explored. Given that the medical field historically experiences poor employee retention
rates (Hayes et al., 2006), high degrees of burnout (Shanafelt et al., 2002), and low
employee satisfaction (Bhatnagar & Srivastava, 2012), the impact of any error
management technique on these work-related perceptions is potentially relevant.
Purpose of the proposed research project
In light of these remaining questions, this project seeks to examine the
hypothesized but untested causal relations between the just culture error management
approach and frontline perceptions (organizational justice, organizational
trustworthiness), intention to engage in safety-critical behaviors (safety compliance,
5

event reporting) and organization-focused work attitudes (attractiveness for employment,
organizational commitment), using a vignette-based experimental research design.
Furthermore, this project seeks to examine the hypothesized mediating influence of
organizational perceptions (organizational justice, organizational trustworthiness) on the
relations between error management and safety behaviors (compliance, reporting).
In additional, this project explored the degree to which event outcome severity
impacts the organizational perceptions of justice and trustworthiness and/or constrains the
association between error management and perceptions. Finally, the analyses control for
extraneous variables of age, gender, experience with medical errors, and familiarity with
concepts of just culture. The following sections will outline the major research questions
associated with the current study, followed by key term definitions, and statements about
the significance and limitations of the present research.
Major Research Questions that guided the Research Hypotheses
a. Does just culture error management increase perceptions of organizational justice
and organizational trust compared to punitive or blameless error management?
b. Does just culture error management increase likelihood of engaging in safetyfocused behaviors, such as safety compliance and error reporting, compared to
punitive or blameless error management?
c. Does just culture error management increase positive organizational attitudes,
such as attraction for and commitment to the organization compared to punitive or
blameless error management?
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d. Do perceptions of organizational justice and trust mediate the relationship
between error management and behavioral intentions (safety compliance, event
reporting)?
e. Do organizational perceptions (justice and trust) mediate the relationship between
error management and work-related attitudes (organizational attraction,
organizational commitment)?
f. Does severity of the event moderate the relationships between error management
and organizational perceptions?

Definition of Terms
Just culture error management. The primary concept behind just culture is that
effective error management seeks to maximize accountability for safety by addressing the
specific underlying causes of errors, whether individual or system/organizational. As
such, just culture flexibly combines components of the punitive and blameless strategies,
depending on the unique circumstances in which errors arise. For example, if a medical
error is determined to have system cause, individuals are met with some combination of
consolation, emotional support, and/or additional training in combination with systemfocused solutions (Reason, 2000). However, if a medical error arises because individual
workers have behaved recklessly (repeated similar mistakes, working under the influence,
blatant disregard for safety, etc.), just culture requires they face some form of punitive
consequence. To adequately respond to a given medical error, just culture involves a
holistic, system-focused assessment of protocols, policies, and environmental factors, as
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well as thoughtful consideration of personnel variables, such as prior behaviors,
motivations, etc. (Kohn et al., 2000; Reason, 1997; Muething et al., 2012).
Punitive or person-focused error management. Punitive error management refers
to proactive and reactive management strategies that emphasize the role of punishment in
ensuring workers behave safely on the job (Reason, 1995). In practice, organizations that
employ punitive strategies respond to medical errors by applying reprimand, personnel
review, demotion, dismissal, or other disciplinary treatments to the individuals involved
in the error, and rely on fear campaigns to keep workers vigilant in their safety practices
(Reason, 2000). In some extreme cases, healthcare workers have been fired, stripped of
licensure, criminally prosecuted, and spent time in jail after committing errors in the
course of care that resulted in serious harm or patient death.
Blameless or system-focused error management. Blameless error management
refers to proactive and reactive strategies that utilize compassion for healthcare workers,
and emphasize the importance of trust building in ensuring that safety is maximized at
work (Reason, 1995). In practice, organizations that employ blameless strategies respond
to medical errors with emotional support and consolation; encourage providers to openly
and fearlessly discuss their errors and the circumstances that surrounded the error.
Unlike punitive strategies, blameless error management holds the organization
responsible for addressing unsafe conditions that resulted in medical error. In this way,
the individual healthcare worker involved in the error is treated with a blame-free
response.
Organizational justice. The concept of organizational justice emphasizes fairness
as a consideration in the workplace (Greenberg, 1990). Organizational justice, therefore,
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refers to the extent to which employees perceive the organization to behave in a just
manner with regard to its employees, which involves equitable and deserved treatment
across a variety of domains (pay, promotion, etc.). In traditional organizational literature,
there are three distinct components of organizational justice: distributive justice is
primarily concerned with fairness of outcomes (Adams, 1965), procedural justice
involving fairness of processes and procedures (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and
interactional justice involving fairness of interpersonal treatment (Greenberg, 1990). In
addition, interactional justice can be further distilled into two categories: interpersonal
justice refers to the degree to which individuals are treated politely and with dignity and
respect, whereas informational justice focuses on the explanations provided to people that
convey information about procedures and outcomes (Bies & Moag, 1986).
Organizational trust. The concept of trust appears in a variety of social science
literatures and is widely regarded as “a psychological state comprising the intention to
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of
another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). In this context, trust refers to the extent to which
employees place high confidence in their work setting, believing strongly and
unabashedly that the future conduct of the organization will be positive (Lewicki et al.,
1998). Individuals displaying a high level or organizational trust are described as being
willing to rely on the organization despite the risk that it might not follow through on its
obligations (Colquitt et al., 2007). Empirical research has also shown that trust is related
to the removal of psychological barriers that stifle improvement in the quality of a
relationship, such as the delegation of crucial tasks to others, rejection of safeguards, and
full disclosure of information (Colquitt et al., 2007).
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Safety compliance behaviors. Safety compliance behaviors refers to following
safety rules, regulations, policies, procedures, avoiding unsafe behaviors and risk-taking,
and adhering to the dictates of safety expectations at work (Mearns et al., 2003). Safety
compliance behaviors generally refer to the safety expectations hospitals have for
frontline staffers; for example, maintaining a sterile field during invasive procedures,
engaging in hand hygiene behaviors, or following bed-turning protocols. Safety
expectations are typically role- and task-based; i.e., employees in certain positions are
provided specific safety guidance for their job tasks, and completion of these tasks in a
safe manner is considered central to their job performance. Therefore, failure to comply
with safety regulations can have serious health consequences for patients, such as
development of infections and other hospital-acquired conditions (e.g., pressure injuries).
As would be expected, organizations exhibiting low safety compliance rates have
increased risk for medical errors and hospital-acquired infections and reduced satisfaction
among employees (Barling et al., 2003; Ayim & Gyekye, 2005; Song et al., 2007).
Event reporting. Event reporting is the purposeful sharing with the organization
when employees learn of, or are personally involved in, patient safety events or medical
errors. Event reporting typically involves using a computerized event log or software
system that collects event-related information from frontline staff and shares it with the
hospital’s risk management, quality management and improvement, or patient safety
teams. In many cases, event reporting can be accomplished anonymously (Suresh et al.,
2004). Event reporting is vital to an organization because of the information that it
provides about frequent medical errors, possible system failures within the organization,
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and other risks to patient safety. Despite critical nature of information involved, the vast
majority of medical events and errors go unreported (Waring, 2005).
Organizational commitment. Organizational commitment refers to individual’s
identification with and participation in the organization (Mowday et al., 1979). Allen and
Mayer (1990) proposed that three different mind-sets underlie organizational
commitment: affective commitment, normative commitment, and continuance
commitment. Affective commitment is driven largely by positive emotional feelings
about an organization (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986). Normative commitment is driven by
moral obligations. Continuance commitment is driven by feelings of commitment that
result from the growing cost of accumulated investments in a particular course of action
that would be lost if one were to change ways (Meyer & Parfyonavoa, 2010).
Organizational commitment is thought to positively affect organizational performance
and quality of work by decreasing the occurrence of undesirable results, such as
tardiness, absenteeism, and quitting (Meyer & Allen, 1988).
Organizational attraction. The concept of organizational attraction refers to the
degree to which an individual (typically, an applicant) is attracted to an organization as
potential employer; or the general desirability of an individual to work for an
organization. Organizational attractiveness research seeks to understand what
organizational characteristics attract individuals, or particular types of individuals, to
apply for a position at an organization, or pursue and accept a job offer (Williams, 2013).

11

Significance of the problem and justification
Given the number of preventable errors affecting the healthcare system annually,
hospitals and healthcare administrators face increasing pressure to improve safety records
with demonstrable, proven, evidence-based strategies. Simultaneously, the impact on
workforce morale must be included in a comprehensive review of organizational
strategies available to healthcare administrators. It is hoped that the findings of this study
will provide empirical evidence for several important, unanswered questions in the field
of healthcare error management. First, this study examines the degree to which error
management impacts employee perceptions of organizational justice and trust; both of
which are related to key hypotheses in the just culture literature. Secondly, this study will
help illuminate the role of error management in creating safer workplaces (via increased
behavioral intentions for safety-critical behaviors), as well as, encouraging organizational
readiness (via organizational commitment and attraction).
Importantly, the concepts of system-based solutions and just culture have
permeated the field of patient safety for roughly two decades. However, expected
consequent reductions in error rates and perceptions of punitive treatment have failed to
materialize at a national level (Sorra et al., 2012). Several reasons may account for this
state of affairs. First, just culture may be an effective tool for error reduction, but it has
not been applied evenly or appropriately in various healthcare settings. In fact, evidence
suggests that some just culture implementations have managed to leave an underlying
culture of blame in place, such that punishment is emphasized and a focus on frontline
worker accountability rather than management or systemic accountability is pervasive
(Hudson et al., 2008). If this were the case, one would expect that the hypothesized
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outcomes of just culture (improved trust, increased sense of justice, increased safetycritical behavior) would emerge when examined with rigorous experimental methods.
Alternatively, just culture may not be an effective tool for achieving the outcomes
hypothesized in the literature; and more appropriate techniques need to be uncovered.
Answers to these questions will aim to provide significant benefit to healthcare
administrators hoping to utilize an effective error management program to reduce their
overall patient harm, while also maintaining a motivated, engaged, and committed
workforce. Through this exploration, a greater understanding of the impact of error
management on frontline workers may be gained, and critical empirical evidence may
warrant investment in the key initiatives around error management. Alternatively, should
the study hypotheses not be met, this research could signal that further scrutiny be placed
on the just culture claims. Ultimately, this research will provide direction for those who
seek to improve the quality and safety of modern healthcare through error management
tools. Given the significant financial, operational, and public-relation burden healthcare
errors incur on institutions, hospital administrators are eager for solutions that will
increase reporting and reduce harm.

Basic assumptions and limitations
The present study has several limitations that restrict the generalizability of the
findings. First, the proposed methodology utilizes a convenience sample of nursing
students from a single, large urban university. Convenience samples can be problematic
for experimental research, and may result in findings that are unique to the specific
culture, geographic region, university, education, or curriculum of the sample. Nurses-in-
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training likely differ from working healthcare professionals in a variety of ways,
including (but not limited to), robust medical experiences and involvement with medical
errors, tenure within healthcare organizations, income level, and age. Therefore, caution
must be applied to these findings when considering the impact of error management
strategies on currently employed healthcare professionals. A third limitation of this study
centers on the use of research vignettes as the experimental manipulation. Vignettes are
used throughout the social sciences; although their use in nursing research is less
developed (Hughes & Huby, 2002). Vignette-based research has several advantages:
mainly, research can be easily conducted on topics that are difficult to simulate in
experimental labs, and on attitudes or behaviors that are sensitive for participants.
However, vignette-based research must also address potential issues of ecological
validity. The use of manipulation checks and subject-matter expert reviews will likely
increase the confidence researchers can have in the ecological validity of their vignettes.
Despite these limitations, much may still be gained from surveys of nurses-in-training
and their perception of a hypothetical organization following vignette error management
descriptions; these individuals will be entering the healthcare workforce and will be
exposed to various forms of error management from potential employers, and will be
vulnerable to medical errors (West et al., 2006, Singh et al. 2007). Furthermore, as
students, nurses-in-training are familiar with the challenge that medical errors pose for
the healthcare profession, and are less likely to be influenced by real-world conflicting
factors that may limit the impact of error management (robustness of job market;
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with other components of the work or organization,
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colleague social support, performance reward systems, etc.). A more detailed explanation
of the study limitations will be presented in later chapters of this study.
Summary and transition to Chapter II
Error management plays an integral role in the overall safety and effectiveness of
the healthcare system. Due to several highly publicized reports on medical errors, the
healthcare system has faced increased scrutiny regarding the degree to which patients are
harmed during the course of seeking medical care. The field of error management arose,
in part, to develop key organizational interventions that will reduce the likelihood that
errors reach patients and cause unnecessary harm. Just culture has been promoted as the
gold standard of error management; primarily because it is expected to increase several
types of safety-critical behaviors, while simultaneously developing a transparent,
accountable, and trusting work environment for employees. In addition, it is expected that
just culture will have a positive impact on employee work-related attitudes that are
critical for organizational success. High levels of these attitudes are desirable for an
industry that famously struggles with retention, burnout, and low satisfaction. In the next
Chapter, a thorough review of the Just Culture literature will be presented, and the
theoretical foundations that underlie the study hypotheses will be discussed.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Healthcare error management has drastically transformed in the last two decades.
For most of the 20th century, the traditional approach to error management in healthcare
relied heavily on punitive strategies, such as blaming and punishing individuals for
errors, scolding against carelessness, and threatening punishment for future mistakes.
Called the person or punitive approach (Reason, 2000), this perspective focused on
unsafe actions made by people at the “sharp end” of care: nurses, physicians, surgeons,
anesthesiologists, pharmacists, and others. The person approach operates according to a
cognitive framework known as the “just world hypothesis” (Montada, 1998), wherein an
individual’s consequences (whether good or bad) are assumed to be morally deserved.
From the perspective of medical errors, the just world theory emphasizes personal
responsibility for errors and their outcomes (Reason, 1998). In this way, individuals who
commit medical errors do so because of some personal attribute, failure, or condition; not
due to randomness or environmental factors.
Though common for many decades in the medical field, the punitive approach
came under scrutiny in the mid-1990s, when researchers, hospital administrators, and
even frontline healthcare workers began to speak out about the negative effect of blame
on employee health and satisfaction (Reason, 1995; Kohn et al., 2000; Wu, 2000). In the
pivotal IOM report (Kohn et al., 2000), the punitive approach was widely critiqued for
the lack of improvement in the field of patient safety. The reasoning for this critique was
that a singular emphasis on the person at the sharp end of care ignored critical features of
the overall healthcare system that could contribute to patient harm. As a result, patient
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advocates, researchers, and hospital administrators largely embraced the notion that
punitive strategies must be abandoned for true progress in safety to begin.
Rather than focusing on individual practitioners, the IOM report argued that
unsafe organizational “systems” must be addressed (Kohn et al., 2000), giving rise to the
perspective known as the system approach. The system approach (Reason, 1995) argues
that most errors originate from “blunt end” organizational factors – environmental, social,
and otherwise – that make safe behavior less likely, by increasing the likelihood for
errors, setting perverse incentives that encourage unsafe behavior, or making correction
more difficult. Based on a psychological understanding of human performance variability
(Normal Accident Theory; Perrow, 1984; and Behavioral Drift), proponents for the
system approach argued that human errors are normal and predictable by-products of any
human endeavor; and should be treated as such. For instance, healthcare workers perform
complex work tasks, make difficult decisions under ambiguous circumstances, operate in
highly distracting workspaces, and often juggle competing priorities within environments
that can either optimize or threaten safety. In the best cases, the social, physical, and
hierarchical environments encourage, even force, the safest possible outcomes (i.e.,
medication bar code scanning prevents wrong patient drug administrations). However, in
many cases, errors arise under circumstances that serve to increase their likelihood (i.e.,
computer software that is confusing or unintuitive; critical calculations that rely on
mental math rather than automated processes; potentially harmful drugs whose
appearance is very similar to innocuous drugs). The system approach acknowledges that
even the most competent and careful workers will make mistakes; even the most
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motivated workers will (under certain conditions) sometimes drift from standard
procedures (Reason, 2000).
The famous 2009 case involving lead pharmacist, Eric Cropp provides an
illustrative example. Cropp made a lethal error that resulted in the death of two-year old
patient, Emily Jerry. Upon further review of the circumstances surrounding the event,
several systemic factors were identified: the error happened on a busy Sunday morning
with low staffing; Cropp was stressed, tired and hungry, having been unable to take any
breaks during his shift; routine maintenance of the pharmacy computer system caused a
back-up in ordering; labels of the IV admixtures were printed later than usual, causing a
delay (and subsequent rush) in preparing solutions; the chemotherapy order was
incorrectly ordered as STAT, resulting in pressure to fill order quickly; several vials of
the sodium chloride solution were left on a crowded table, and the technician answered in
the affirmative when asked whether she had used sodium chloride, but Cropp did not
confirm which of the solutions had been used on the Jerry order. According to the system
approach, this combination of systemic factors (busy workday, rushed orders, incorrect
orders, technological delays, workstation circumstances) increased the likelihood that
Cropp made his crucial mistake (failed to detect the technician’s error) and proceeded to
dispense the incorrect solution that resulted in Jerry’s death. Unfortunately, Cropp’s
situation is not uncommon. In fact, a study into accident injury to patients hospitalized in
New York during 1984 (Leape et al., 1991) found that a quarter of the injuries reviewed
were initially deemed to involve negligence by the individual staff member. However, a
deeper examination of the incidents highlighted factors beyond the control of the
individual that played pivotal roles. Further, over half of the incidents reviewed were
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deemed to be caused by errors in management, many of which were underpinned by high
patient volumes and over-extended staff (Leape et al., 1991). Some errors that initially
appeared to be negligence were often not due to an individual’s incompetence or
disregard for the standard, but rather their ignorance of what the standard was. This was
preceded by poor dissemination and reinforcement of practice guidelines: systemic
issues, rather than issue with the individual practitioners. By employing a systems
approach, the IOM report argued that organizations can make meaningful and farreaching changes to that will reduce “sharp end” errors and other unsafe behaviors, or
contain them in order to keep patients safe (Kohn et al., 2001). Hospital administrators
were encouraged to respond to errors and unsafe behaviors with blameless strategies –
providing compassion and understanding for frontline workers in difficult situations;
developing blame-free reporting systems, and fostering an environment where errors
were primarily considered “learning opportunities” that would result in system-level
fixes. As a result, much optimism existed for the future of patient safety as a field at the
beginning of the 21st century.
Unfortunately, applying blameless strategies to real-world scenarios have proven
difficult to implement (Bagain, 2006), and have been discouraged by seminal voices in
the field of patient safety (Reason, 1997). At times, some healthcare workers truly behave
recklessly and knowingly put their patients in danger, leaving system-focused hospital
administrators ill-equipped to respond (Bagain, 2006). In these cases, a blameless culture
would be neither feasible nor desirable, as some unsafe acts cannot be tolerated within a
healthcare environment. For instance, in 2011 in the United Kingdom, a nurse knowingly
distributed lethal levels of saline to his patients, killing two (Field, 2008). In 2014, a
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Dallas hospital was sued after a neurosurgeon, accused of drug and alcohol addiction,
botched several surgeries under the influence; including one in which a patient bled to
death and another that left the patient a quadriplegic. In 2009, a Denver hospital
discovered that a surgical technician had been abusing an injected painkiller, and
replacing the used syringes with saline or water. As a result of her actions, thousands of
patients were exposed to hepatitis C (Brown, 2010). In addition, there are examples of
less sensational risky behavior: a nurse repeatedly ignoring key safety protocols despite
warnings; a physician who fails to address an obvious, emerging medical situation with
appropriate concern or intervention; a technician who breaks protocol in an effort to wrap
up his/her shift early. It was argued that an organization operating within a no-blame
culture – where extreme risk-takers or habitual rule benders/breakers are immune from
punishment – would erode safety and worker motivation to remain error-free, reduce
levels of trust and employee morale, and undermine management credibility (Reason
1998, Khatri et al. 2009).
Following the IOM report, Marx (2001) published a widely-read just culture
primer for healthcare that aimed to address the flaws inherent in the blameless and
punitive approaches. Unlike the previous approaches, Marx maintained that applying just
culture error management allows hospitals to flexibly address the unsafe systemic
features of healthcare work, while also holding individual workers accountable for safe
practices and punishing egregious abdications of duty. This view had support from
leaders within other high-risk industries, where similar practices had been implemented,
and was quickly embraced by experts and administrators alike. Implementation of a just
culture approach involves the adoption of algorithm-based decision-making following an
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error. If the algorithm indicates that punitive responses are appropriate, one is provided.
Alternatively, if the algorithm indicates that systemic issues, such as poor training, poor
safety culture and norms, ill-conceived managerial decisions and priorities, technical and
environmental problems, or other external factors had a significant effect on the frontline
provider involved in the error, more moderate error management approaches are
suggested (consolation, training, coaching, and warnings), and system-based fixes are
developed.
Despite the widespread embracing of just culture principles, punitive strategies
associated with a person approach remain common and improvements in healthcare
safety are lagging. Five years after the IOM report, a follow-up report was published with
equally dismal descriptions of healthcare safety and medical error rates (Bleich, 2005). In
fact, some ten years after the original IOM report was published admonishing punitive
strategies, Eric Cropp was fired, fined, stripped of his license, and ultimately imprisoned
for his unintended medical error. In 2012, a report published by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) found that only 44% of surveyed healthcare
providers describe the response to error at their organization as “nonpunitive” (Sorra et
al., 2012). It is clear that just culture and systemic error management have neither been
fully adopted nor fully successful at the national level; however, the following section
describes evidence suggesting that the hypothesized outcomes can and will be realized
when implemented effectively.
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Literature Review
The following section will address theory. First, the theoretical justification for
just culture error management will be described. Next, each hypothesized outcome of just
culture will be addressed separately, including relevant evidence and theory for the
hypothesized associations. Efforts will be made to highlight opportunities or gaps within
the literature that need addressing. Finally, a summation of common just culture
algorithms will be provided.
Just Culture Error Management Theories
Just culture error management relies of three theoretical foundations: Equity
Theory, Trust theory, and Social Exchange Theory. In organizational settings, Equity
Theory (Adams, 1965) has informed the literature on organizational justice and has been
used to explain how perceptions of justice may arise in employment settings. In brief,
Equity Theory argues that equity, or fairness, is driven by the degree to which an
individual’s outcomes or consequences involve (1) outcome fairness, or a balance
between an individual’s inputs (their contributions or costs) and outputs (their results or
gains), and (2) social comparison, or a similarity of the output to a referent other.
Roughly, fair outcomes will be those that are deserved or earned, and are applied
consistently within relevant groupings. Alternatively, when contributions are high/costly
and the returns are low, or vice versa, and consequences are not distributed similarly
among the group, an individual is likely to perceive the outcome to be unfair or unjust.
Perceptions of equity can be applied to individual events, as well as, to global interactions
with persons, organizations, groups, governments, etc. In organizational literature, this
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perception of fairness about the behavior of the organization is known as organizational
justice.
Perceptions of organizational justice are socially-constructed and strongly
influenced by subjective intuitions (Greenberg, 1987, 2000). According to organizational
justice literature, employees form opinions about three main organizational behaviors:
whether decisions about the distribution of resources and other outcomes are fair, known
as distributive justice; whether procedures and processes that lead to decisions are fair,
known as procedural justice; and whether the interpersonal treatment employees receive
as decisions are made is fair, known as interactional justice (Greenberg, 2000). Although
less common in organizational research, distributive justice may also be applied to the
decision outcomes associated with the punishment for wrongdoing (a form of distributive
justice termed, retributive justice). In general, punishments are held to be just to the
extent to which they take into account relevant criteria such as the refutability of the
evidence, the seriousness of the crime, and the intent of the perpetrator (all components
of outcome fairness, or degrees of deservedness); and discount irrelevant criteria, such as
race, gender, relation, or social status (reflecting concerns about social comparisons;
Greenberg, 1987).
Equity theory additionally argues that the experience of inequity causes a person
to feel distress, which may be reduced through efforts to restore actual or psychological
equity (Adams, 1965). One may modify contributions (inputs), by either increasing their
contributions or reducing them, may change their perception of the inequity (convince
themselves it is fair), or may withdraw from the unfair interaction altogether (Walster et
al., 1973) In other words, equity theory predicts that individuals are unlikely to statically
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remain in situations they deem unfair or unequal at-will; rather, one will be motivated to
achieve a balance within that interaction, even if it comes at some cost.
Mayer’s Integrative Organizational Trust theory (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman,
1995) highlights the underlying hypotheses of just culture: specifically, that fair treatment
generates the formation of trusting relationships between the organization and the
employee. The theory specifies the characteristics of the trustee that are required to
develop and maintain trust: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability is the
amalgamation of skills, competencies, and characteristics, which enable a party to have
influence within some specific domain(s). For most people, this ability will be limited to
a single domain, such as clinical work or financial management, although trusting
someone’s ability in less concrete skills may cover a number of domains (Zand, 1972).
Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor.
Trustees show that they understand and value the trustor and intend to do good to them.
Finally, integrity involves the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of
principles that the trustor finds acceptable. Such issues as the consistency of the party’s
past actions, credible communications about the trustee from other parties, belief that the
trustee has a strong sense of justice, and the extent to which the party’s actions are
congruent with their words all affect the degree to which the party is judged to have
integrity (Mayer et al.,1995). According to this theory, in order to engender trust in
organizational settings, members must demonstrate their ability to create desired
outcomes, their goodwill towards others, and the acceptability of their values and
principles. The type of trust which is the least difficult to establish is that which comes
through the accumulation of direct or indirect experience with the trustee – experience
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that provides formative understanding of his or her integrity, benevolence, and ability.
Therefore, the main drivers for higher organizational trust arise from actions and
interactions with organizational agents (leaders, managers, etc.) at every level (FirthCozens, 2003). A growing consensus points to the importance of trust in improving
general organizational functioning: such things as group cohesion, job satisfaction and
organizational effectiveness (Driscoll, 1978; Mishra & Morrisey, 1990; Podsakoff et al.,
1996).
Social Exchange Theory (SET; Homans, 1959) can be used to understand the
relationship between error management and employee safety attitudes and behaviors.
SET has its origins in sociology (George Homans, Peter Blau), behavioral psychology
(B.F. Skinner, Albert Bandura), social psychology (Thibaut & Kelly), economics (D.
Ricardo, Adam Smith, J.S. Mill) and anthropology (Levi-Straus). The underlying
framework that unites many of these perspectives is that individuals behave for profit or
the expectation of profit. Across a wide variety of circumstances, behaviors are seen as
profitable when the reward for the behavior (e.g., positive consequences, needs met)
outweighs the cost of the behavior (e.g. negative consequences, punishments, effort
expenditure). Out of this very basic desire to seek rewards and avoid costs, individuals
create sets of strategies that they believe will increase the odds in their favor when
interacting with others. SET describes how complex social relationships can be
understood as a series of “exchange interactions” between dyadic partners (Emerson,
1976) that either support or discourage the likelihood of favorable personal outcomes.
Exchange interactions are behaviors directed to one’s dyadic partner; for example, a kind
or friendly gesture. Individuals perform behaviors that are likely to return favorable
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outcomes from their exchange partners (i.e., the behavior is profitable) and avoid those
that will return unfavorable outcomes (i.e., the behavior is unprofitable).
Social exchange relationships function by certain “rules” of exchange
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), which can be used to make predictions about how
relationships will evolve. The most common exchange rule across all settings is
reciprocity, or repayment in kind. In reciprocity, one member of the dyad may be seen as
initiating positive or negative exchanges towards the exchange partner. Under the rule of
reciprocity, these initial exchange behaviors generate a sense of obligation in the
receiving partner, and prompt them to produce a reciprocal response. When the initial
exchanges are perceived to be kind or favorable, reciprocity dictates that the partner will
generate kind and favorable responses in return. In fact, research has shown reciprocity to
be a strong influence in determining exchange behavior, even when the original favor or
kindness was not wanted, or was provided by an unfavorable partner. Alternatively,
unkind actions will likely elicit obligations for unkind responses (Gergen et al., 1980).
When parties abide by the reciprocity rule, SET posits that relationships are most likely
to develop into trusting, loyal, cooperative, and mutually beneficial commitments
(Homans, 1959). Specifically, a self-reinforcing cycle can emerge: the expectation that
one’s kind actions will be returned encourages individuals to extend initial acts of
kindness or cooperation towards those with whom they enter into a long-term relationship
(Emerson, 1976). Alternatively, when exchange actions are negative and retaliatory, the
cycle may lead to severe breakdown in cooperation or rising tensions.
SET has been used to characterize a variety of relationships, including those
between romantic dyads, work partners or teams, institutions, governments, and relevant
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to this study, between employees and various organizational targets. Within an
organizational setting, the presumption in SET is that workers will form distinguishable
social exchange relationships with multiple work targets simultaneously: immediate
supervisors (Liden et al., 1997), coworkers or team members (Cox, 1999), customers
(Houston et al., 1992), and even employing organizations (Moorman et al., 1998).

Literature and Theories that form the basis of study hypotheses
Organizational justice. This study hypothesizes further that just culture will be
associated with increased perceptions of organizational justice compared to punitive or
blameless culture (Hypothesis 1). Just culture advocates argue that perceptions of
organizational justice will be enhanced under a just culture, as compared to either a
punitive or blameless error management approaches. There are several reasons to assume
that just culture would promote perceptions of organizational justice compared to
punitive or blameless error management. As discussed in the previous section, justice
perceptions are enhanced under conditions of outcome deservedness and consistency with
social comparisons (Equity Theory; Adams, 1965). Organizations that establish protocols
to provide fair and honest assessment of the real causes of errors, are more likely to
balance the inputs and outputs of individual workers throughout the error management
processes. Further, just culture guarantees that these same processes will be applied
consistently, via explicit rules and algorithms, across all individuals in the organization.
More generally, findings in organizational literature suggest that justice perceptions
depend on adherence to distributive justice, as well as, to procedural justice rules
(Thibaut & Walker, 1978). Procedures that allow participants to have a voice will be
considered fairer than a procedure that prohibits participations from having their say,
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explaining their views, or expressing their needs. Just culture requires that organizations
examine the error from the perspective of the individual healthcare worker involved.
Although achieving both fairness and the perception of fairness is critical to the
just culture mission, few research studies have examined the relationship between just
culture and frontline perception of justice. Battard (2017) studied the effects of a just
culture training program on a single healthcare institution. The results suggest that just
culture is associated with improved perception of nonpunitive response to errors (Battard,
2017), a key dimension in the organizational safety culture (Sorra & Dyer, 2010) but not
a true measure of justice. In fact, one would expect that perceptions of a nonpunitive
response to errors would increase under any systemic approach, be it just culture or
blameless culture. In addition, von Thadden et al. (2006) found that just culture
implementation resulted in an increased sense of organizational accountability and
responsiveness for some workers (physicians reported greater sense of accountability and
responsiveness compared to nurses). However, again, these measures fail to specifically
address a sense of justice or fairness within the organization. To date, researchers have
not provided specific evidence to conclude that just culture improves the perceptions of
fairness or organizational justice among employees.
Organizational trust. Just culture is expected to be associated with increased
perceptions of organizational trust compared to punitive or blameless culture (Hypothesis
2). Just culture advocates argue that trust plays a central role in the association between
just culture and its associated outcomes (Reason, 1997), specifically error reporting.
Evidence suggests that trust is important for safe, positive and transparent work
environments; breakdowns in trust can result in increases in defensiveness about errors,
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unwillingness to examine the cause of accidents, loss of regulatory legitimacy in the eyes
of the regulated (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2008), reduced likelihood to report errors, and
loss of confidence that they will not be blamed for mistakes (Burns, Mearns, &
McGeorge, 2006).
The assumption that just culture will be associated with improved perceptions of
trust is based in theory. Jeffcott et al. (2006) argue that individuals act within institutional
contexts, and construe trust as a set of attitudes and expectancies about other people and
the organizational systems within which they are embedded. In such contexts, displays of
organizational justice are a key signal of trustworthiness (Moorman & Bryne, 2005).
Trust is particularly important in organizations that deal routinely with risk and
uncertainty and the possibility of significant consequences because employees risk
exploitation when they affiliate and cooperate with corporations around issues such as
medical errors and on-the-job mistakes. As such, the degree to which just culture error
management interactions signal that organizations are able to effectively respond to
errors (ability), care and value employees (benevolence), and act within an acceptable
value structure (integrity), one would expect that trust would increase. In fact, advocates
of just culture error management argue that the careful balance of system- and personbased principles in responding to errors are designed to maximize these very attributes:
signaling ability to manage errors, care for employees and their difficult work
circumstances, and a fairness value structure within an organization. In just culture,
leaders acknowledge the very real difficulties of clinical care – the stress involved, the
lack of resources and, above all, the real anxiety that comes from making errors – and
aim to respond with fair objectivity. In order to engender the trust of staff, leaders
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demonstrate their values and principles by, for example, keeping their word that errors
will be treated fairly, taking into account the system and context of the incident when
implementing error management.
Empirical evidence has shown consistent linkages between fairness and trust
(Lewicki et al., 2005). Furthermore, results from organizational research points to some
general findings about the types of conditions that promote trust within organizations. In
general, organizations need to have higher staff participation in decision-making, more
openness of communication (Clark & Payne, 1997), provide high job security, and –
especially relevant to the current study – exhibit procedural justice, deliver fair rewards
and punishments, and provide ethical work environments (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992;
de Cremer & Sedikides, 2005). Whitener et al. (1998) found that trust increases under
cultures characterized by “inclusiveness, open communication and valuing people” where
managers are rewarded for “collaborating, sharing information, explaining decisions,
discussing issues openly and showing concern”. Given that just culture is designed to
maximize clear communication about expectations of safe behavior, and provide fair
treatment in terms of the types of errors that attract disciplinary procedures, one would
expect that these features would increase the sense of trust employees’ experience. In
addition, good supervisory relationships have a very strong positive effect on reported
levels of organizational trust (Clark & Payne, 1997). The quality of this relationship has
been found also to depend on feedback, supervisor confidence and support, fairness of
reward and punishment, approachability, openness of communication, and opportunity
for participation. Finally, researchers have argued that an organization’s culture holds the
capacity to affect trust; that is, a positive safety culture – the shared sense among
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employees of how the organization operates with regard to safety – will affect trust. Just
culture is frequently described as a subcomponent to a larger safety culture (Reason,
1995); however, literature reviews of the factors measured in association with safety
culture (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) have shown that trust is rarely measured.
When questionnaire items about trust are included, they usually consist of one or two
(Mearns et al., 2000), and they are not linked explicitly to just culture.
Although trust is central to the concept of just culture, only one study has
explicitly examined the associations between a just culture program and organizational
trust among impacted staff. Within the railway industry, Mutler (2011) found that the
adoption of just culture was related to greater reports of trust and increased safety
communication among rail personnel. Relatedly, Jeffcott et al. (2006) used qualitative
evidence to suggest that a range of factors associated with just culture, including
appropriate supervisory response to safe/unsafe conduct, management commitment to
safety, and directives that prioritize safety over speed or schedules, operate on important
trust relationship within train operators in the U.K. railway industry. Some evidence
suggests an organization’s response to errors can significantly impact the degree to which
employees will feel trusting towards the organization (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2008).
For example, when a more adversarial and blaming approach was initiated in response to
a rail accident, trust between the regulator and those being regulated was found to be
significantly damaged (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2008).
Error reporting. This study hypothesizes that (a) just culture will be associated
with increased error reporting compared to punitive or blameless culture (Hypothesis 6);
and that (b) the relationship between error management and error reporting is mediated

31

by perceptions trust (Hypothesis 8). Several real-world correlational associations between
just culture and error reporting behaviors have been reported in aviation, rail, offshore oil
and gas industry (Høivik, 2010; Hudson et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2005; von Thaden &
Hoppes, 2006), nuclear safety (Reiman & Norros, 2002) and healthcare (Dekker, 2007);
and the available evidence suggests that just culture may improve error reporting. For
instance, the implementation of a just culture program was associated with an increase of
recordable injuries at The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (Høivik, 2010), and a
significant increase in reporting of aviation incidents, particularly of ‘low risk’ events and
near misses (von Thaden & Hoppes, 2006). In the UK, as a consequence of the just
culture implementation in healthcare, incident reporting improved significantly. For
example, between October and December 2004, the total number of incidents reported in
England and Wales reached 26,508 compared to the previous year when 158 incidents
were reported. The period from January to March 2011 show the total number of
incidents reported climbed to 312,98051. These figures show clearly the dramatic change
in the health industry’s reporting culture. In addition, Barnsteiner and Disch’s (2017)
work found that that the implementation of a Just Culture Model in the nursing
educational facility helped students better understand that they can report near misses or
errors without fear of being dismissed from the nursing program for making “honest”
mistakes. In contrast, Waring (2005) examined semi-structured interviews with medical
professionals and found that a culture of blame in the aftermath of errors inhibits medical
reporting.
Although this evidence provides some support for the association of just culture
on error reporting, it is not clear that just culture itself accounts for the reported increases
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in reporting across these studies. All studies utilized a quasi-experimental design, lacked
a control condition, and failed to address potential confounding factors, such as increased
emphasis on safety or error reporting that coincided with the use of the just culture
program. In fact, Baines (2008) attributed increased reporting to the belief that the just
culture principles would be followed and that punitive action would be considered within
the just culture policy, but also suggested that unrelated factors had an impact, such as a
better understanding of reporting requirements though training, more effective
investigations and dissemination of findings, and increased belief that reporting will
make a difference in improving safety. Additionally, it could be that any transitions away
from a punitive- to systems-focused mindset had the effect of improving reporting, and
that a blameless culture would have the same benefit as the just culture strategies.
Associations between trust and justice and error reporting are less common.
Tangirala and Ramanujam (2008) investigated the cross-level effects of procedural
justice on employee’s silence by surveying 606 nurses. The research concluded that
justice moderated the effects of employee’s silence such that silence increased when
justice was low. Additionally, organizational trust increased intention to use error
reporting system in a sample of healthcare professionals in Japan (Wu et al., 2008).
Safety compliance. The current study hypothesizes as well that (a) just culture will
be associated with increased safety compliance compared to punitive or blameless culture
(Hypothesis 5); and that (b) the relationship between error management and compliance
is mediated by perceptions of justice and trust (Hypothesis 8). Ultimately, just culture
error management claims to improve safety and reduce error rates via increases in
accountability and commitment for safety behaviors among staff, including compliance
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to safety policies, procedures, and processes. It is expected that fair punishments and
rewards associated with just culture will maintain appropriate accountability for safe
behaviors; whereas blameless error management provides immunity for unsafe practices
and encourages risk-taking.
The relation between just culture and safety compliance can be explained via the
social exchange and equity theories. First, SET articulates that organizational behavior
towards employees will return like behavior. For instance, positive (fair and just)
treatment towards employees should encourage positive organizational-referent work
behaviors. Organizational researchers have consistently found the dimensions of justice
to be related to employee work-related behaviors (Colquitt et al., 2001), including
measures of job and task performance (Masterson et al., 2000). Ambrose et al. (2007)
argued that distributive justice affects attitudes about specific events (e.g., satisfaction
with error management response), whereas procedural justice and interactional justice
affect attitudes about the system (e.g., organizational commitment, trust in authorities,
etc.). As a result, it is expected that just environments result in greater employee
satisfaction and subsequently better performance in their duties as specified in their job
descriptions. Furthermore, organizational cultures that support fair and trustworthy
treatment towards employees will also encourage and reward trustworthy behavior more
broadly (Firth-Cozens, 2003). In addition, the impact of organizational justice
perceptions on performance may stem from Equity Theory; when people perceive
injustice they seek to restore justice. One way employees can restore justice is by altering
their level of performance. As a result, justice perceptions will improve performance
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(Karriker & Williams, 2009). In sum, just culture should reduce decision-based and
blameworthy noncompliance, and increase efforts to perform safely.
Evidence supports the SET and Equity hypotheses. Ball et al. (1994) surveyed
supervisors and their disciplined subordinates about specific punishment events.
Punishments perceived as “harsh” were associated with the supervisors’ perception of the
subordinates’ subsequent task performance. Although harshness is an imperfect corollary
for fairness, these findings suggest that unfair punishments can affect subsequent task
performance, such as safety compliance. Aryee et al. (2002) found that equitable
exchange relationships between managers and employees motivate employees to act in
accordance to organizational norms that emphasize service quality. In a study of 507
hospital nurses, Brooks and Zeitz (1999) found total quality management (TQM)
dimensions were related to perceptions of procedural justice. Presently, no evidence
exists linking any error management strategy to improved safety compliance behaviors.
However, the extent to which just culture error management fosters a sense that
punishments are not unduly harsh, and that procedural justice governs decision-making,
and encourages equitable exchange interactions between employees and managers; one
might expect such a relationship to exist.
Work-related attitudes. The current study additionally hypothesizes that (a) just
culture will be associated with increased organizational attraction and organizational
commitment compared to punitive or blameless culture (Hypothesis 3, 4, respectively);
and that (b) the relationship between error management and these organizational attitudes
is mediated by perceptions of justice and trust (Hypothesis 7). Positive work-related
attitudes, such as organizational commitment and organizational attraction, are important
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antecedents to job performance and organizational effectiveness (Riketta, 2002). When
employees feel positively about their organization and their work, they are more
motivated on the job and willing to expend additional efforts to get their job done. In
addition, attraction to the organization predicts improved rates of recruitment, retention,
and voluntary turnover; all of which have significant impact on an organization’s bottom
line.
As was described previously, SET argues that pro-social organizational behavior
towards employees will produce increased subsequent obligations for pro-social
employee behavior and feelings toward the organization. For instance, organizational
researchers have consistently found the three dimensions of organizational justice to be
related to employee work-related attitudes (Ambrose et al., 2007; Colquitt et al., 2001).
Several studies have suggested that unfair procedures lead to lowered commitment in
employees (Bakhshi et al., 2009; Brooks & Zeitz, 1999; de Cremer, 2005; Masterson et
al, 2000). A meta-analysis found that justice perceptions were moderate predictors of joborganization attraction (Chapman et al., 2005). Furthermore, Ambrose and Schminke’s
(2009) analyses revealed that overall justice perceptions fully mediated the relationship
between specific justice dimensions (distributive, procedural, and interactional) and
employee attitudes of satisfaction and commitment. Such findings comport with
Greenberg’s (2001) argument that individuals form impressions of justice by making
holistic judgments, and that overall sense of organizational fairness may drive employee
behaviors. Furthermore, Aryee et al. (2002) found that trust in one’s organization
partially mediated the relation between justice and the work attitudes of job satisfaction,
turnover intention, and organizational commitment. Empirical evidence has linked trust
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in one’s organization to organizational commitment and intention to remain (Robinson,
1996; Robinson & Morrison, 1995). Although no previous research has specifically
examined the relation between just culture and organizational attraction or organizational
commitment, the evidence above, albeit somewhat limited, provides some basis for
assuming that (to the degree that just culture engenders a sense of justice and trust in the
organization), these outcomes can be expected.
The 10 distinct hypotheses are summarized below and with Figures 1 and 2,
showing the interrelationships among the proposed hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Just culture will be associated with increased perceptions of
organizational justice compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 2: Just culture will be associated with increased perceptions of
organizational trust compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 3: Just culture will be associated with increased organizational
attraction compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 4: Just culture will be associated with increased organizational
commitment compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 5: Just culture will be associated with increased safety compliance
compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 6: Just culture will be associated with increased error reporting
compared to punitive or blameless culture.
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between error management and organizational
attitudes (commitment and attraction) is mediated by perceptions of justice and
trust.
Hypothesis 8: The relationship between error management and behavioral
intentions (safety compliance and error reporting) is mediated by perceptions of
justice and trust.
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Error Management Path Behavior Intention Path Model

Figure 2. Hypothesized Error Management Path Attitude Path Model
Finally, there may be several demographic and error-specific variables how these
error management techniques are perceived and responded to by individuals. For
instance, a worker may have worse opinions of organizations generally when the events
result in significant patient harm compared to no harm, which may translate to reductions
in subsequent perceptions. Similarly, event severity may moderate the association
between error management and organizational perceptions. For example, the difference in
perceived justice or trustworthiness between punitive and just culture might be reduced
under conditions of high event severity likewise, the difference between blameless and
just culture may be reduced under conditions of low event severity. Finally, demographic
variables such as age, gender, prior experiences with errors (either as a provider or as a
patient) or familiarity with concepts of Just Culture and system-based error prevention
may shape how individuals interpret and respond to error management strategies. This
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study makes no specific hypotheses regarding these relationships, but will examine these
variables as covariates on perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intention outcomes.
Measurement and Implementation of Just Culture
This final section examines the specifics of just culture error management,
including an overview of the different types of unsafe behaviors that can lead to errors, a
comparison of the most common just culture algorithms, and a description of available
mitigation strategies. In practice, just culture relies on several techniques in determining
what constitutes a fair response in the aftermath of a medical error – error typology, and
just culture algorithms.
Error typology. The first technique involves the adoption of a behavior typology
system (Marx, 2001), where only some of the unsafe behaviors are determined to warrant
disciplinary sanctions. Understanding the error typology guides managers towards
effective mitigation strategies. The three types of unsafe behaviors include: human error,
at-risk error, and reckless error.
1. Human error is said to have occurred when the individual should have done
other than what he/she did, and inadvertently caused or could cause an
undesirable outcome. Human errors may (a) have to do with limits in human
capabilities or range of normal performance variability, or (b) result from
external performance-shaping factors. Examples are misreading a label
(human variability) when under duress or time pressure (performanceshaping factor) can result in the wrong drug being administered to a patient.
2. At-risk behavior (also called, negligence) is characterized as conduct that
involves a misperception of risk; where the individual drifts into unsafe
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habits and does not recognize the level of risk involved or mistakenly
believes the risk to be justified. At-risk behaviors are intentional behaviors;
often involve short cuts, violations of procedures, and relaxation of
compliance to rules or regulations; and are more culpable than human error
(Reason, 1997). At-risk behavior also encompasses the legal term “negligent
conduct”, which is defined as conduct that “falls below the standard required
as normal in the community” (Marx, 2001). In most states, negligence is
defined as a failure to exercise the skill, care, and learning expected of a
reasonably prudent healthcare provider (Marx, 2001). In essence, negligence
refers to conduct that the person should have been aware was substantially or
unjustifiably risky. It applies to a person who fails to use the reasonable level
of skill expected of a person engaged in that particular activity, whether by
omitting to do something that a prudent and reasonable person would do in
the circumstances or by doing something that no prudent or reasonable
person would have done in the circumstances. In general, the just culture
approach is not to punish those who engage in at-risk behaviors; rather, the
goal is to uncover and remedy the system-based reasons for the behavior and
decrease staff tolerance for taking these risks through coaching.
3. Reckless behavior (also called, gross negligence) involves the knowing and
intentional choice to take substantial and unjustified risks. Gross negligence
differs from negligent conduct in intent; negligence is the failure to recognize
a risk that should have been recognized; gross negligence is a conscious
disregard of a visible, significant risk. Reckless behaviors arise for various
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reasons: individuals may personally enjoy risk-taking, desire an adverse
outcome for a patient, or believe that the behavior will somehow benefit
them or the organization. Recklessness is implicated when individuals make
conscious choices to disregard what they know to be considerable risks in
favor of one of these personal motivations.
Algorithms. The second technique used is to apply some form of an algorithm to
the event. Various just culture algorithms are available; the common ones include
Reason’s Culpability Decision-Tree (Figure 3), and Hudson’s refined Just Culture model
(Figure 4), as well as the commercially available Just Culture Algorithm™ (licensed by
Outcomes Engineering, LLC. https://www.outcome-eng.com/). Common to all
algorithms is incorporation of a series of questions used to determine the extent to which
individuals should have known or done better than to have made the medical error and to
what extent the individual should face blame.
Reason’s Culpability Decision-Tree (1997) was the initial just culture algorithm
available within the patient safety literature. The Culpability Decision-Tree assumes that
the actions under scrutiny have contributed to an accident or a serious medical event and
acknowledges that a number of different unsafe acts are likely to have contributed to the
event (Reason, 1997). As such, the decision-tree should be applied separately to each
contributing action. Unlike later algorithms, Reason’s decision-tree does not specify
particular just culture responses; instead, it describes the degree of culpability one might
have for each contributing behavior. Reason’s Culpability Decision-Tree includes five
lines of questioning:
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1. Intended act: The first line of questioning in the decision-tree relates to intention.
If both actions and consequences were intended, then it is possibly criminal
reckless behavior, which is the most culpable of behaviors and deserving of most
severe consequences (sometimes, legal).
2. Unauthorized substance: When the action was intended but the consequence was
not, the second line of questioning involves the influence of alcohol or drugs
known to impair performance at the time that the error was committed. A
distinction is made between substances abuse with and without “reasonable”
purpose (or mitigation), which, although still reprehensible, is not judged to be as
blameworthy as taking drugs for recreational purposes. Unauthorized substance at
the time the error was committed is considered a highly culpable act, and may
have legal ramifications for the individuals involved.
3. Deliberate violation: The third line of questioning considers whether the behavior
was a deliberate violation of the rules, and distinguishes between system-induced
violations and those not supported by system factors. If the system promoted or
encouraged the violation, the behavior is seen as less culpable than if the
individual violated procedures for personal reasons. System-induced violations
include violations that had become automatic or part of the “local working
practices” or norms.
4. Substitution test: The fourth line of questioning focuses on whether a different
person (well-motivated, equally competent, and comparably qualified) would
have made the same error under similar circumstances (as determined by their
peers). If “yes”, the person who made the error is probably acting in non-culpable
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ways, which are viewed as either system-induced behaviors (insufficient training,
selection, or lack of experience) or within normal human performance variation
(i.e., human errors). If “no”, then negligent behavior should be considered.
5. Repetitive errors: The final line of questioning asks whether the person has
committed unsafe acts in the past. This does not necessarily presume culpability,
but it may imply that additional training or counseling is required.

Figure 3. Reason’s Culpability Decision-Tree.
Hudson et al. (2000) expanded and increased the complexity of Reason’s
Culpability Decision-Tree by integrating different types of errors and their cause
(Hudson’s refined Just Culture Model; Figure 4), and including recommended specific
error management strategies or “solutions.” This model (also called “Hearts and Minds”)
defines accountabilities at all levels (frontline workforce, manager, and supervision) and
categorizes unsafe acts according to the motivation from which they arose (from “normal
compliance” to “exceptional violation”). This approach includes the following three types
of information to guide those involved in deciding accountability: violation type, job role,

43

and consequence (either punishment or coaching). Rather than following a line of
questions, Hudson requires the administrator to first identify the underlying motivation of
the erring healthcare worker. Motivations may include:
1. Normal compliance: Behavior that is in compliance with all procedures and best
practices. Not an error.
2. Unintentional violation/awareness/understanding: The error involves actions that
were thought to be in compliance with procedures and practices. These behaviors
are consistent with human errors, as defined by Reason (1997), and result in “no
blame for the worker”.
3. Routine violation: The error conforms to the norms and culture of the
environment in which the error was performed. These types of system-producing
behaviors are generally consistent with Reason’s (1997) definition of at-risk
behaviors – where risk is unrecognized due to the norms that permeate the
environment. Hudson suggests that routine violations should be met with “active
coaching” at all levels of the environment.
4. Situational violation: The error was unavoidable; the procedure cannot be
followed if one is to get the job done.
5. Optimizing violation: The violating error was done knowingly, but was thought
to benefit the company; risk was unrecognized.
6. Personal optimizing violation: The violating error was done knowingly, but was
thought to personally benefit the worker; risk was unrecognized.
7. Reckless personal optimization: The violating error was done knowingly, and
risk was known.
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8. Exceptional violation: Rare and exceptional errors that the organization may not
be prepared to handle or predict.

Figure 4. Hudson’s Refined Just Culture Model, “Hearts and Minds”
In sum, the application of just culture error management involves recognition of
the types of unsafe acts that can contribute to preventable patient harm (human errors, atrisk behaviors, and reckless behaviors), and the application of algorithms to guide
hospitals in their error management tactics. Although the various algorithms differ to
some degree, there are several underlying truths that guide the development of an
appropriate “just” response to errors across all three approaches. First, human errors (or
unintentional violations” per Hudson) are least culpable behaviors that should be treated
with blameless consolation. Secondly, at-risk errors should be treated with system45

focused solutions and performance shaping strategies (coaching or remedial actions, such
as training and education), but not disciplinary actions; until repetitive issues warrant
more severe responses. Finally, reckless behaviors, where the risk is known and
undertaken anyway, deserve punitive or disciplinary actions.
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Chapter 3
Method
Restatement of purpose
This study examined the relation between error management techniques (just,
punitive, or blameless strategy), event severity, organizational perceptions
(organizational trust and organizational justice), safety-critical behaviors (safety
compliance, error reporting), and organizational attitudes (organizational attraction,
organizational commitment).
Description of participants
Individuals were recruited from upper-level nursing undergraduate students at a
large, urban university. These students were identified for participation because they will
have completed 80% of the requisite bachelor-level nursing coursework, including at
least one on-the-job training placement with preceptor nurses. Demographic variables,
including age, gender, year of degree, familiarity with just culture concept, and
experience with medical errors (harmed by medical error, or made an error during care),
were collected. The return rate (% of respondents completing the entire survey) was
calculated, with a description of non-responders included in the final analysis.
Description of instruments/measurement procedures
Stimulus materials. Two salient components of the vignette served as the study
independent variables. The first independent variable – error management response – had
three levels (punitive, blameless, and just), while the second – event severity – had three
levels (no harm, harm) as well. These components were combined to yield six separate
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vignettes, which each preceded by an at-risk medical error description. This resulted in 6
(3x2) conditions. The components of the vignette appear in Appendix A.
Material development. Vignettes were constructed with the help of personnel
(Nursing Administrators, Quality Management and Patient Safety personnel, and Risk
Manager) employed at a local research pediatric hospital, based on just culture algorithms
in the literature. The error description used in the present study, which was the same
across all 9 experimental conditions, was developed based on a single at-risk medical
error description modified from Marx (2001). Modifications include the addition of an indepth description of the healthcare worker’s motivations and considerations involved in
making the at-risk error, as well as contextual information about the work environment
(managerial decisions and focus). The harm description and error management
description were developed for the purpose of this study.
To ensure that the three error management approaches were applied appropriately
in the vignettes, 5 independent subject matter experts (SMEs) trained in error
management were asked to rate each vignette component on the degree to which it
matched the three error management approaches, and the degree to which the vignettes
were “realistic”. All SMEs were experienced healthcare professionals (Nursing
Managers, Patient Safety and Risk Managers, etc.) working in a pediatric hospital setting
who had completed a training course on the use of error management in a clinical setting
by an outside vendor. Fleiss’s kappa (Fleiss, 1971) for the vignette materials were above
.80, characterized as excellent agreement.
Survey materials. Survey materials measured 6 variables: 1. Organizational
justice, 2. Organizational trust, 3. Organizational commitment, 4. Organizational
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attractiveness, 5. Safety compliance, and 6. Error reporting. Each is described in detail
below. For each measure, the participant was asked to consider the hospital’s error
management response (actions taken as a result of the safety event as described in the
vignette) when completing the survey measure.
1. Organizational justice. Organizational justice was measured using the sixitem Perceived Overall Justice (POJ) scale developed by Ambrose and
Schminke (2009). The POJ scale consists of three items to assess individuals’
personal justice experiences and three items to assess perceived organizational
fairness. Individuals report their level of agreement with each POJ statement
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Responses are coded such that higher ratings reflect greater perceptions of
fairness, with the possible range varying from 6 to 42. Internal reliability for
this overall justice scale has been shown to be high, α = .92 and .93 in two
samples (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009).
2. Organizational trust. Organizational trust was measured using Robinson and
Rousseau’s (1994) seven-item Trust scale, designed to assess employee’s
overall perceptions of trust in the organization as an entity. Individuals report
their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Responses to the items were recoded
such that higher ratings reflect greater degree of trust, with the possible score
range varying from 7 to 35. Alphas for this scale were 0.93 (Robinson &
Rousseau, 1994), with a test-retest reliability of .88 (Ng & Feldman, 2013).
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3. Organizational commitment. This construct was measured using the
Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ; Mowday et al., 1979),
which was modified somewhat to reflect observations about the hypothetical
organization. The OCQ consists of 15 items, of which 6 are negatively poled.
Individuals report their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Responses to the
items are recoded such that higher ratings reflect a greater degree of trust, with
the possible range varying from 15 to 75. Internal consistency of the OCQ is
high (alpha = .82 - .93). In addition, Lam (1998) reported a retest reliability of
.59 over a period of 10 weeks.
4. Organization attractiveness. Organizational attractiveness is the degree to
which a respondent shows interest in working for an organization. Attraction
was measured using Schein and Diamante’s (1988) 4-item scale. Participants
were asked to rate their level of agreement for each item, on a scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect a greater
degree of agreement, with the possible range varying from 4 to 20. Internal
consistency of these 4 items is high (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91, 0.92, and 0.93;
Schein & Diamante, 1988).
5. Safety compliance. The Compliance with Safety Behaviors scale (CSB; Hayes
et al., 1998) consists of 11 items that assess how frequently individuals engage
in several forms of safe behavior. Item stems were adapted from this scale to
highlight the degree of accountability and responsibility individuals feel
towards engaging in safety compliance at the hypothetical organization
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mentioned in the vignettes (i.e., As an employee at this organization, I am
expected to…) rather than in general. Responses range from 1 (“never”) to 5
(“always”), with a possible range of scores varying from 1 to 5. After
recoding negatively worded items, higher scores reflect greater compliance
with safe work behaviors. CSB scores were calculated by averaging the
responses. An example item was “Follow all procedures regardless of the
situation”. Internal reliability of these items has been reported as moderate
(Cronbach = 0.85; Hayes et al., 1998).
6. Intention to report similar error. Error reporting intentions were measured
using a five item instrument developed by Kim (2005) to assess likelihood for
reporting errors. Respondents answer the questions using a 10-point Likert
scale ranging from 0 (never) to 10 (always), with possible average scores
values ranging from 0-10. An example item is “If I committed an error that
had no adverse effect on patients, I would report the error to the organization”.
Cronbach’s alpha has been found to be 0.85 (Kim, 2005) and 0.83 (Ko & Yu,
2017).
Description of procedures
Undergraduate subjects were contacted during regular class time and asked to
participate in the survey-based study prior to a class presentation. The survey was
administered at the beginning of the class time, with participants randomly assigned to
one of 6 experimental conditions. Although each participant read and responded to only
one of 6 vignettes, all respondents were asked to complete all of the other measures listed
above (i.e., demographics and 6 questionnaires). Following completion of the survey, the
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Chief Patient Safety Officer from a local pediatric hospital and/or the lead researcher
presented a brief lecture on patient safety, as compensation for participation.

Preliminary Analyses
To help ensure that the error described in the vignettes is truly an “at-risk” error
as defined in the previous chapter, a pilot study was conducted with 50 working nurses
recruited through an online survey tool, SurveyMonkey™. The nurses were asked to read
the event description and complete a six-item attribution measure (Hofmann & Stetzer,
1998) using a seven-point Likert rating scale. The six statements concern the contribution
a particular cause had on the event described in the vignette, including the individual’s
carelessness, time pressure to finish the task more quickly, pressure from management,
poor choices on the part of the individual, the situation in general, and the individual in
general. Causes are categorized as either internal (relating mainly to the individual) or
external (relating mainly to the situation). Respondents rated each statement on a sevenpoint (1-7) strongly disagree/strongly agree Likert scale, with high scores indicating
agreement that a particular cause contributed to the event. Results suggest that both
internal items (M =4.87, SD = 1.4) and external causes items (M = 5.59, SD = 1.1) were
rated as highly contributing to the event.
Check on randomization to groups. All demographic variables were analyzed to
determine if randomization was successful in achieving a balance among the groups. For
dichotomous variables, logistical regressions were conducted; for continuous variables,
two-way MANOVAs (comparing participants in all 6 experimental conditions) were used
to assess for differences between experimental groups.
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Manipulation check. Three manipulation check items were created for this
research project (Appendix B). Manipulation check items focused on the specific
independent variables associated with the study, asking participants to indicate which of
several options listed actually occurred within a given vignette. In the first item,
participants were asked to identify the error that occurred in the vignette from several
options. In the second item, participants were asked to identify what type (if any) harm
was experienced by the patient. In the last item, participants were asked to identify
whether the nurse, the organization, or both nurse and organization were responsible for
the event. Data collected from any participants responding incorrectly (< 100% correct)
to these manipulation checks were removed from further analysis. These checks were
used to “weed out” participants who did not understand the medical scenario, or who
otherwise did not attend to details in the vignette in order to respond in a meaningful way
to the experimental condition.
Assessing data assumptions. The data were examined for univariate and
multivariate outliers, normality, independence of observations, and linearity between
variables. For continuous variables, univariate outliers were considered standardized
cases that are outside the absolute value of 3.29 (>3 standard deviations away from the
mean on a single variable). Once univariate outliers were removed from the dataset,
multivariate outliers were assessed for and removed using Mahalanobis distance. Data
was examined for missingness, with greater than 5% missing considered problematic
(Schafer, 1999).
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Primary analyses
Relations between study variables. Correlational matrices were prepared for all
study variables to examine the degree of relatedness between all sets of pairs.
Differences between groups. A 3 (Error Management: Punitive, Blameless, vs.
Just) x 2 (Event Severity: No Harm, vs. Severe Harm) Multivariate Analysis of
Covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted to examine the differences between conditions
across the 6 study dependent variables: organizational justice, organizational trust, safety
compliance, error reporting, organizational commitment, and organizational attraction,
controlling for study covariates. Follow-up ANOVAS were conducted to analyze further
any significant variables, with appropriate post-hoc analyses applied to isolate more
precisely the source of the significant findings. For non-normal variables, a series of nonparametric tests were conducted to assess differences across study conditions and
covariates. All of these analyses were performed using the latest version of SPSS [version
26].
Mediation Tests. Baron and Kenny (1986) hierarchical regression mediation
analyses were first conducted on each outcome variable independently as an initial check
on mediation and to identify the relevant covariates to be included in subsequent path
models. This approach is designed to supplement more comprehensive modeling and
fails to account for potential covariance among outcome variables. Establishing
mediation using this approach involves four steps (1): establish there exists an effect that
may be mediated by showing a predictor variable is correlated with the outcome; (2)
establish the predictor variable is associated with mediator variable(s); (3) establish that
the mediator(s) affect the outcome variable; and (4) evaluate for complete mediation,
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where the strength of the association between predictor(s) and outcome variable is
reduced to zero when controlling for mediator(s). Following this approach, each
dependent variable was regressed onto error management conditions (dummy coded
categorical variable) and event severity. In a stepwise fashion, the independent variables
and covariates were entered into the regression analysis (step one), followed by the
mediator variables of organizational justice and organizational trust (step two: added
simultaneously). Any covariates that were shown to be significant in the MANCOVA
analyses were included in step one. All analyses were performed using SPSS [version
26].
Path analysis. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM or path analysis) is a theorydriven data analytic approach for the evaluation of a priori specified hypotheses about
causal relations among measured and/or latent variables. SEM involves model
conceptualization, parameter identification and estimation, data-model fit assessment,
and potential model re-specification. Ultimately, this process allows for the assessment of
fit between correlational data and one or more competing casual theories. Path analysis is
a form of SEM, which emphasizes the relationships between the measured study
variables, but does not evaluate the reliability of the measurement simultaneously. Path
analysis allows one to test direct and indirect effects in a system of regression equations,
examine the ability of more than one predictor variable to explain one or more dependent
variable; and to fix parameters at certain values to produce parsimonious statistical
models. For the present study, path analysis was conducted to evaluate the hypothesized
mediating role of perceptions of perceived organizational justice and organizational trust
between error management and organizational attraction and organizational commitment,
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safety compliance, and error reporting, as well as the direct effect of event severity on
these perceptions. All path analysis was conducted in the Mplus (version 8) statistical
analytics software.
Model specification. Model specification is the process for identifying what
variables are independent variables, dependent variables, mediators, and which
parameters will be freed or estimated. Two primary models were pursued in this study;
one measuring the impact of error management and event severity on organizationalfocused outcomes (organizational commitment and organizational attraction), and the
other measuring the impact of error management and event severity on individualbehavioral intention outcomes (safety compliance and error reporting). Using the
McArdle-McDonald reticular action modeling (RAM) symbolism for model diagrams
(McArdle & McDonald, 1984), every model parameter that required a statistical estimate
was represented. In both models, error management and event severity were treated as an
exogenous categorical independent variable and were free to vary. Error management
was dummy-coded where EM1 = punitive error management, EM2 = blameless error
management, and just culture was the reference condition. Endogenous variables have a
disturbance which will be estimated in the model and free to covary. A disturbance
represents all omitted or unmeasured causes (unexplained variance). A disturbance
correlation reflects the assumption that the corresponding endogenous variables share at
least one common omitted cause, such as measurement method. All model parameter
estimates were tested for statistical significance based on a ratio of the test statistics to
standard error using a t- or z-statistic. For statistical significance, the z-test was required
to exceed 1.96.
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Model identification. The goal of identification is to confirm the specified models
are “overidentified”, or a model for which there are more known parameters than free
parameters. The following equation was used to calculate the number of parameters that
can be estimated with the primary study variables: Np = p(p+1)/2, where ‘p’ is the
number of observed variables in the model (i.e., 6 variables; 7 total with dummy coding).
For the current study, the equation with dummy coding error management is 7(8)/2= 28.
The addition of any known significant covariates will increase the number of parameters
within the model. When comparing nested models, procedure dictates that one first
analyzes the “full” model (with the greatest number of parameters), then compares the
reduced model to determine the best fitting, most parsimonious solution. All models were
over-identified, meaning each contained less than 28 parameters requiring estimation
(total sum of all variances, covariances, and direct effects within the path model).
1. Attitudinal Models: Error Management and Event Severity on Attitudinal
outcomes: Using “just culture” error management as a reference group, attitudinal
analyses evaluated full and partial mediation models, where justice and trust
mediate the relationship between error management and attitudinal outcomes of
organizational attraction and organizational commitment, controlling for the
direct effect of severity on organizational perceptions. Covariation between
endogenous error terms was estimated in both models (i.e., mediator error terms
were allowed to covary, as will dependent variable error terms). First, the partial
mediation model (Figure 5) was assessed where the direct effects are estimated
(free to vary) with the model. Next, a full mediation model was produced; with
indirect effects of error management and attitude outcome variables constrained to
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zero (nested model, Figure 6). Goodness of fit indices were evaluated for model
fit; and the best fitting, most parsimonious model was retained. Finally,
multigroup severity analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the relationship
between error management and organizational perceptions were equal across
event severity conditions.

Figure 5. Hypothesized Organization-Focused Attitude Partial Mediation Path
Model.

Figure 6. Hypothesized Organization-Focused Attitudes Full Mediation Path
Model.

2. Behavioral Intention Models: Error Management and Severity on Behavioral
Intention outcomes: Using “just culture” error management as a reference group,
behavioral intention analysis evaluated full and partial mediation model that
examined the effects of justice and trust on the relationship between error
management and behavioral intention outcomes of safety compliance and error
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reporting, and the direct effect of severity on organizational perceptions. All
relevant covariates were included for their effect on the outcome variables
directly. Covariation between endogenous error terms were estimated in both
models (i.e., mediator error terms were allowed to covary, as were dependent
variable error terms). First, the partial mediation model was assumed (Figure 7);
where the direct effects were estimated with the model. Next, a full mediation
model was assessed with indirect effects of error management and attitude
outcome variables constrained to zero (nested model). Goodness of fit indices
evaluated for model fit; and the best fitting, most parsimonious model was
retained.

Figure 7. Hypothesized Individual-Focused Behavioral Intention Partial
Mediation Path Model.
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Figure 8. Hypothesized Individual-Focused Behavioral Intention Full Mediation
Path Model.

Path Model fit. Model fit was assessed using the chi-square goodness of fit test,
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis,
1973), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Hu & Bentler, 1999), and the
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999). The chi-square (χ2)
goodness of fit test assesses the difference between the predicted and sample covariance
matrix, or whether the residual matrix is different from zero across each element in the
matrix. A non-significant chi-square (χ2) indicates that the model represents the data. In
addition, a number of other model fit indicies (e.g., CFI, TLI, RMSEA, SRMR) will be
examined and reported. Only RMSEA and χ2 statistic have distributional properties and
can evaluate statistical significance. For CFI and TLI, values range from 0 to 1, and
values closer to 1 indicate greater degree that the covariation in the data can be
reproduced by the model. Values between .90 and .95 are often considered acceptable
model fit. For RMSR and RMSEA, values range from 0 to 1, and values closer to 0
indicate lesser degree of difference between the predicted and observed variances and
covariances in the model. Values less than 0.05 is good model fit, 0.05 to 0.08 is an
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adequate model fit, 0.08 and 0.10 is a mediocre model fit, and greater than 0.10 is a poor
model fit. Chi-square difference tests compared iterative models, and the best-fitting,
most parsimonious model was retained.
Moderation effects of event severity. Finally, using cross-group equality
constraints, multigroup severity analysis were conducted to evaluate whether the
relationship between error management and organizational perceptions were equal across
event severity conditions. The fit of the model with parameters constrained to be equal
across groups was then compared with that of the unrestricted model without the equality
constraints using a chi-square difference (ꭓ2 difference statistic).
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Chapter 4
Results
Two primary models were tested with SPSS and MPLUS in order to address the
research questions posed earlier. The first examined the casual relationships between
error management and event severity, organizational justice, organizational trust, error
reporting, and safety compliance. The second investigated the casual relationships
between error management and event severity, organizational justice, organizational trust,
organizational commitment, and organizational attraction
The below sections discuss the data collection process, summarize the baseline
statistics and demographic characteristics of the sample, and report on the statistical
analyses.
Data Collection
A total of 258 upper-level nursing undergraduates were sampled in this study.
Four participants were removed from the analysis due to incorrect responses to the
manipulation check items, and another 2 participants exhibited a large amount of missing
data (greater than 5% of responses). Five participants were removed as univariate or
multivariate outliers. As a result, 247 individuals were included in the analysis. Random
assignment to groups resulted in 77 (31.2%) participants in the punitive condition, 89
(36.0%) participants in the blameless condition, and 81 (32.7%) participants in the just
culture condition. Demographic variables, including age, gender, familiarity with just
culture concept, and experience with medical errors (harmed by a medical error, or made
an error during care), were collected and summarized in Table 1. The participants ranged
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in age from 19 to 52 (M = 24.5, SD = 5.8); most were female, and had no previous
experiences with errors as either patient (92.7%) or provider (81.4%). Familiarity with
just culture ranged from 1.00 (not at all) to 5.00 (very familiar) (M = 1.9, SD = 1.2).
Several multivariate logistic regressions were performed to examine whether
randomization was effective across conditions for the gender, error as a patient, and error
as a provider covariates. Non-significant results suggested that the error management
groups were not significantly different on any covariate. Results suggested no difference
between error management groups on any of the binomial covariates (Gender: Wald ꭓ2=
.373, p = .830; Error as patient: Wald ꭓ2= .991, p = .082; Error as provider: Wald ꭓ2=
2.180, p = .091). Additionally, no difference was found for event severity for any of the
binomial covariates (Gender: Wald ꭓ2= .574, p = .082; Error as patient: Wald ꭓ2= .911, p
=.634; Error as provider: Wald ꭓ2= .861, p = .353). Two-way MANOVA tests were
conducted to determine if age differed by groups, indicated no difference in mean age for
error management condition [F(5) = 2.535, p =.081] or event severity [F(1) =.136, p =
.712)]. Therefore, randomization to experimental conditions was considered successful.

Table 1
Participant Demographics by Experimental Condition
Freq. Percent Punitive Blameless

Just
Culture

No
harm

Harm

71
9
1
81

104
12
1
120

109
17
3
127

Gender
Females
Male
Other
Total

213
29
5
247

86.2
11.8
2.0
100.0

66
8
3
77

76
12
1
89

63

Table 1 Continued
Freq.
Error as patient
229
No
18
Yes
247
Total
Error as provider
201
No
46
Yes
247
Total

Percent Punitive

Blameless

Just
Culture

No
harm

Harm

92.7
7.3
100.0

71
6

81
8

77
4

112
8

118
9

81.4
18.6
100.0

64
13

74
15

68
13

101
26

100
20

Descriptive statistics for all 6 of the study variables are reported in Table 2 below.
Furthermore, in order to assess normality, skewness and kurtosis were calculated for all
study variables within condition. All values were within -3 to +3, however, ShapiroWilkes tests suggest non-normality of disturbances within each error management
condition for safety compliance, error reporting, and organizational attraction (Table 3).

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables
N

Min

Max

M

SD

Organizational Justice
Organizational Trust
Safety Compliance
Error Reporting
Commitment
Attraction

1.00
1.00
1.64
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
5.00
5.00
10.00
6.87
5.00

4.07
2.96
4.44
8.05
3.83
2.57

1.39
.80
.80
2.08
1.14
1.04

247
247
246
247
247
247
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables by Error Management Type
Error Management Type
Min Max
M SD Skew Kurtosis Shapiro
-Wilkes
Org. Justice
1.00 6.83 3.45 1.39
.086
-.857
.973.
Org. Trust
1.00 5.00 2.79 .83
.267
.312
.979.
1.64
5.00
4.38
.88
-1.581
1.353
Safety Compliance
.732*
Punitive
1.00 10.00 7.89 2.42 -1.035
.132
Error Reporting
.837*
N = 77
1.00 4.75 2.23 .87
.384
-.381
Org. Attraction
.951*
-.810
Org. Commitment 1.00 5.87 3.35 1.18 -.009
.982.
Org. Justice
Org. Trust
Safety Compliance
Blameless
Error Reporting
N = 89
Org. Attraction
Org. Commitment

Just
N= 81

Org. Justice
Org. Trust
Safety Compliance
Error Reporting
Org. Attraction
Org. Commitment

1.00
1.00

6.83 4.00 1.30
4.17 2.80 .71

-.086
-.128

-.539
-.565

.986.
.987.

.86. -1.169

.065

.759*

2.97 10.00 8.24 1.90 -1.102
1.00 4.75 2.46 .99
.158
1.00 5.87 3.79 .99 -.250

.335
-.932
-.094

.856*
.945*
.995.

2.17 7.00 4.80 1.15 -.205
2.00 5.00 3.34 .75
.111
2.91 5.00 4.64 .56 -1.828
3.00 10.00 8.00 1.88 -.923
1.00 5.00 3.05 1.11 -.174
2.20 6.87 4.37 1.04
.296

-.432
-.790
2.290
.123
-.817
-.417

.974.
.980.
.695*
.883*
.953*
.995.

1.91 5.00

4.34

Z-score transformation brought organizational attraction into normality (Punitive:
Shapiro-Wilkes = .972, p = .068; Blameless: Shapiro-Wilkes = .974, p = .097; Just
Culture: Shapiro-Wilkes = .968, p = .062) and was thus used in subsequent parametric
analysis. Analyses involving error reporting and safety compliance, however, were
restricted to non-parametric tests, as appropriate.
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Bivariate correlations were computed to assess the relationship between the
demographic and dependent variables. None of the demographic variables of age, gender,
familiarity with Just Culture, error as patient were significantly associated with the
primary study variables. Error delivering care as a provider was significantly correlated
with error reporting behavioral intention (r = .160, p = .012). Table 4 depicts these
correlations.
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Table 4
Pearson Correlations of Study Variables
1

Safety Compliance (3)

Error Reporting (4)

Commitment (5)

a

3

4

5

r

1

N

247

r

.689

p

<.001

N

247

247

r

.300

.244

p

<.001

<.001

N

246

246

246

r

.107

.039

.316

p

.093

.538

<.001

N

247

247

246

247

r

.780

.726

.366

.132

p

<.001

<.001

<.001

.037

N

247

247

246

247

247

r

.695

.724

.241

.006

.728

p

<.001

<.001

<.001

.930

<.001

Organizational Justice (1)

Organizational Trust (2)

2

Attraction (6)

6

1

1

1
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1

1

7

8

9

10

11

Table 4 Continued
a

Attraction (6)

Gender (7)

Age (8)

Familiar with JC (9)

Error as patient (10)

Error delivering care (11)

2
247

3
246

4
247

5
247

6
247

7

N

1
247

r

.096

.092

-.087

-.082

-.015

.060

1

p

.138

.152

.175

.203

.813

.350

N

242

244

243

244

244

244

244

r

.002

.085

-.013

.052

.052

.089

.045

p

.980

.195

.847

.430

.432

.176

.496

N

233

233

232

233

233

233

231

233

r

.065

.071

.002

.121

.091

.082

-.016

.044

p

.309

.264

.975

.057

.155

.197

.799

.505

N

247

247

246

247

247

247

244

233

247

r

-.088

-.026

-.106

-.097

-.029

.030

-.017

.217

.003

p

.168

.682

.096

.129

.648

.635

.791

.001

.961

N

247

247

246

247

247

247

244

233

247

247

r

-.052
.416

-.094
.142

-.160
.012

-.018
.782

.009
.891

.086
.181

-.067
.310

.192
.002

-.054
.397

1

p

-.033
.611

N

247

247

246

247

247

247

244

233

247

247

247
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8

9

10

11

1

1

1

Between-Group Results
Mediation outcomes. A two -way MANCOVA was conducted in order to assess
the associations between error management, event severity, and the mediation variables
of organizational justice and organizational trust, while controlling for all study
covariates. Box’s Test was non-significant [Box’s M = 11.649, F =.759¸p = .725] and
Levene’s statistic was non-significant for both justice [F(5, 225) = 1.036, p = .397] and
trust [F(5, 225) = .975, p = .434]. The MANCOVA procedure was significant for error
management conditions management [F(4, 438) = 7.863, p < .001. Wilks’ Λ = .870,
partial η2 = .067], but not for event severity [F(2, 219) = 1.221, p < .297, Wilks’ Λ = .989,
partial η2 = .011] or the interaction term [F(4, 438) = .224, p < .926, Wilks’ Λ = .996,
partial η2 = .002]. In addition, none of the covariates were significant (ps ≥ .321). These
results are depicted in Tables 5. Between-subjects tests indicated significant differences
among error management conditions for both organizational justice, F(2) = 10.971, p
>.001 and organizational trust, F(2) = 7.196, p = .001.

Table 5
Multivariate Analysis of Covariance Tests for organizational perception variablesa
Effect
Wilks’ Λ
F
Hypothesis Error df Sig.
Partial Eta
df
Squared
.790*
13.69
4
438
<.001
.111
EM
Severity
Interaction
Age
Gender

.987

1.40

2

219

.249

.013

.995

0.27

4

438

.995

.003

.995

.560

2

219

.572

.005

1.00

.000

2

219

1.00

.000
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Table 5 Continued
Effect
Familiarity with JC
Error as patient
Error as provider

Wilks’ Λ

F

Error df

Sig.

219

.499

Partial Eta
Squared
.006

.994

.698

Hypothesis
df
2

.993

.791

2

219

.455

.007

.990

1.143

2

218

.321

.010

a. Design: Intercept + EM + Severity + Interaction + all study covariates

Post-hoc ANOVAs were conducted to isolate the differences across error
management conditions for each variable. Just culture was associated with significantly
higher scores for both perceptions compared to punitive (OJ: Mdiff = .9736, p <.001; OT:
Mdiff = .3825, p =.005) and blameless (OJ: Mdiff = .5007, p .043; OT: Mdiff = .4183, p
=.002) error management. All ANOVA results are depicted in Tables 6 below.

Table 6
Post-hoc Analysis of Variance Comparisons for organizational perception variables
DV
(I) Error
(J) Error
Mean Diff Std.
Sig.
95% Confidence
Management Management
(I-J)
Error
Interval
Type
Type
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
Blameless
-.4729. .20984
.064
-.9678
.0219
Punitive
*
Just
-.9736 .21460 <.001 -1.4797 -.4675
Org.
Punitive
.4729. .20984
.064
-.0219
.9678
Blameless
*
Justice
Just
-.5007 .20705
.043
-.9890 -.0124
*
Punitive
.9736 .21460 <.001
.4675 1.4797
Just
*
Blameless
.5007 20705
.043
.0124
.9890
Blameless
.0258. .12128
.975
-.2602
.3118
Punitive
*
Just
-.3925 .12403
.005
-.6850 -.1000
Org.
Punitive
-.0258. .12128
.975
-.3118
.2602
Blameless
*
Trust
Just
-.4183 .11967
.002
-.7005 -.1361
*
Punitive
.3925 .12403
.005
.1000
.6850
Just
*
Blameless
.4183 .11967
.002
.1361
.7005
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .607.
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Attitude outcomes. A two-way MANCOVA was conducted in order to assess the
associations between error management, event severity, and the work-attitude outcome
variables of organizational attraction and organizational commitment, while controlling
for all study covariates. Initial results suggested that the data met the assumptions of
MANOVA (Box’s M = 8.986, F(6) = 1.479, p = .181; Levene’s statistic for attraction:
F(5, 225) = 1.459, p = .235, and commitment F(5, 225) = 1.420, p =.244). The
MANCOVA procedure was significant for error management conditions management
[F(4, 438) = 6.764, p < .001. Wilks’ Λ = .887, partial η2 = .058], but not for event severity
[F(2, 219) = 1.001, p < .369, Wilks’ Λ = .991, partial η2 = .009] or the interaction term
[F(4, 438) = 1.566, p < .182, Wilks’ Λ = .972, partial η2 = .014]. In addition, none of the
covariates were significant (ps ≤ .189). These results are depicted in Table 7.

Table 7
Multivariate Analysis of Covariance Tests for attitudinal variablesa
Effect
Wilks’ Λ F
Hypothesis Error
Sig.
df
df

Partial Eta
Squared

EM

.887*

6.764

4

438

<.001

.058

Severity

.991

1.001

2

219

.369

.009

Interaction

.972

1.566

4

438

.182

.014

Age

.995

.580

2

219

.561

.005

Gender

.985

1.681

2

219

.189

.015

Familiarity with JC

.995

.602

2

219

.549

.005
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Table 7 Continued
Wilks’ Λ

F

Error as patient

.995

.549

2

Error as provider

.994

.619

2

Effect

Hypothesis Error df
df

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

219

.578

.005

219

.539

.006

a. Design: Intercept + EM + Severity + Interaction + all study covariates

Between-subjects tests indicated significant differences among error management
conditions for both organizational attraction, F(2) = 7.306, p = .001, partial η2 =.062, and
organizational commitment, F(2) = 12.829, p < .001, partial η2 = .104. Post-hoc
ANOVAs were conducted to isolate the differences across error management conditions
for each variable. Just culture was associated with significantly higher scores for both
organization-focused attitudes compared to both punitive (OA: Mdiff = .5684, p =.001;
OC: Mdiff = .8334, p <.001) and blameless (OA: Mdiff = .3955, p =.024; OT=C: Mdiff =
.4183, p =.036) error management. All ANOVA results are depicted in Tables 8 below.

Table 8
Post-hoc Analysis of Variance Comparisons for attitudinal variables
DV
(I) Error
(J) Error
Mean
Std.
Sig. 95% Confidence
Management Management
Diff.
Error
Interval
Type
Type
(I-J)
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
Blameless
-.1729. .15209 .492 -.53158 .18576
Punitive
Just
-.5684* .15553 .001 -.93521 -.20162
Org.
Punitive
.1729. .15209 .492 -.18576 .53158
Blameless
Attract.
Just
-.3955* .15006 .024 -.74940 -.04162
Punitive
.5684* .15553 .001
.20162 .93521
Just
*
Blameless
.3955 .15006 .024
.04162 .74940
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Table 8 Continued
DV

(I) Error
(J) Error
Management Management
Type
Type

Mean
Diff.
(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval

Lower
Bound
*
Blameless
-.4151 .17041 .041
-.8170
Punitive
*
Just
-.8334 .17427 <.001
-1.244
*
Org.
Punitive
.4151 .17041 .041
.0132
Blameless
*
Commit
Just
-.4183 .16814 .036
-.8148
*
Punitive
.8334 .17427 <.001
.4224
Just
*
Blameless
.4183 .16814 .036
.0218
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 1.199 for
commitment; .955 for attraction.
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Upper
Bound
-.0132
-.4224
.8170
-.0218
1.244
.8148

Behavioral Intention outcomes. MANCOVA procedures are sensitive to
violations of normality distributions in residuals. Under circumstances where the
underlying data distribution is known to be non-normal, non-parametric tests
(distribution-free) are more robust analytic strategies for examining between-group
differences. Therefore, several non-parametric tests were utilized to examine differences
in safety compliance and error reporting across error management conditions, event
severity, and each of the study covariates. Results suggest that there were no differences
in mean rank across error management groups for safety compliance (Kruskal-Wallis =
5.094, df = 2, p = .078) or error reporting (Kruskal-Wallis = .462, df = 2, p = .794). No
significant differences was found across event severity for either safety compliance (U
=6939.0, p = .219) or error reporting (U = 7343.0, p = .690). However, additional tests
were run for all study covariates, showing a significant difference in error reporting for
participants with previous error experience as a provider (U = 3697.0, p = .032) and
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familiarity with just culture principles (Spearman’s ρ = .117, p =.021).
Table 9
Non-parametric between-subject tests for safety behavior intentions a
Dependent Variable
Effect
Test Statistic
5.094a
Safety Compliance
EM
7340.5b

.693

.094 c

.156

2671.0 b

.251

.072c

.272

Error as patient

1601.5 b

.120

Error as provider

4016.5 b

.229

.462 a

.794

-1.270 b

.204

.036 c

.118

2643.0 b

.207

.117 c

.021*

Error as patient

1623.0 b

.133

Error as provider

3697.0 b

.032*

Event Severity
Age
Gender
Familiarity with JC

Error Reporting

Sig.
.078

EM
Event Severity
Age
Gender
Familiarity with JC

a. Kruskal-Wallis H Test
b. Mann-Whitney U Test
c. Spearman’s rho
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Mediation Analysis
Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method for assessing for mediation, each
dependent variable was regressed onto error management conditions (dummy coded
categorical variable where EM1 = punitive and EM2 = blameless) and event severity. In a
stepwise fashion, these independent variables and covariates were entered into the
regression analysis (step one), followed by the mediator variables of organizational
justice and organizational trust (step two: added simultaneously). Any covariates that
were shown to be significant in the MANCOVA analyses were included in step one.
Attitudinal outcomes. Assumption testing was undertaken for regression analysis
for both attitudinal variables, which found that both attitudes and commitment were
normally distributed, linearly related to predictors, had evidence of independent errors,
homoscedasticity, and normally distributed errors. Attraction was regressed onto error
management conditions (dummy coded categorical variable) and event severity. In a
stepwise fashion, independent variables were entered into the regression analysis,
followed by the mediator variables of organizational justice and organizational trust
added simultaneously. None of the study covariates were included in the procedure due to
the lack of association found in the MANCOVA analysis for organizational attraction. In
step one, both error management dummy variables were significantly associated with
organizational attraction (p’s ≤.01).
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Table 10
Regression analysis for error management and severity on organizational attraction
Estimate

S.E.

p

OA

-

EM1

-.579

.162

<.001*

OA

<---

EM2

-.405

.156

.010*

OA

<---

Harm

.155

.130

.235.

When organizational justice and organizational trust were added to the model in
step two, error management variables were no longer significant (ps ≥ .440), while both
organizational justice and organizational trust were significant (ps <.001). Thus, this is
evidence of complete mediation of the association between error management and
organizational attraction by organizational justice and organization trust. Table 11 depicts
this information.

Table 11
Regression analysis for error management and event severity on organizational
attraction, controlling for perception mediators
Estimate

S.E.

p

OA

<---

EM1

-.086

.111

.440

OA

<---

EM2

-.020

.105

.850

OA

<---

Harm

.034

.086

.689

OA

<---

OJ

.272

.043

<.001*

OA

<---

OT

.609

.075

<.001*

Organizational commitment was regressed onto error management conditions
(dummy coded categorical variable) and event severity. In a stepwise fashion, all
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independent variables were entered into the regression analysis, followed by the mediator
variables of organizational justice and organizational trust added simultaneously. Study
covariates were not included in the procedure due to the lack of association found in the
MANCOVA analysis for organizational commitment. In step one, both error
management dummy variables were significantly associated with organizational
commitment (p’s ≤.015).

Table 12
Regression analysis for error management and severity on organizational commitment
Estimate

S.E.

p

OC

<---

EM1

-.825

.175

<.001*

OC

<---

EM2

-.414

.169

.015*

OC

<---

Harm

.093

.140

.509

Initial results indicated that both punitive and blameless error management
conditions were associated with commitment. However, when organizational justice and
organizational trust were added to the model, blameless management was no longer
significantly associated with commitment (p = .928), while both organizational justice
and organizational trust were significant (p’s ≤.001). Interestingly, beyond the effect of
justice and trust, punitive error management was still significantly different from just
culture error management in commitment. Thus, this is evidence of complete mediation
of the association between blameless error management and organizational commitment
by organizational justice and organization trust, and partial mediation of the association
between punitive error management and organizational commitment by justice and trust.
Table 13 depicts this information.
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Table 13
Regression analysis for error management and event severity on organizational
commitment, controlling for perception mediators
Estimate

S.E.

p

OC

<---

EM1

-.226

.108

.037*

OC

<---

EM2

.009

.102

.928

OC

<---

Harm

-.030

.083

.722

OC

<---

OJ

.413

.042

<.001*

OC

<---

OT

.531

.073

<.001*

Behavioral intention outcomes. Due to known non-normality of the behavioral
data, statistical curve estimation was undertaken for both safety compliance and error
reporting. In both Behavioral intention variables, the linear relationship and exponential
function was estimated with greatest goodness of fit (Safety Compliance: R2 = .018 and
.020, respectively; Error Reporting: R2 = .014 and .023, respectively). Additional
assumption testing was undertaken for both variables, which found that no violations of
independence of errors, homoscedasticity, or normal distribution of errors. Therefore,
linear regression was utilized for the regression analyses. The first requirement for testing
mediation is to establish a relationship between the predictor(s) and outcome variables.
At the first step, blameless error management were associated with a significant decrease
in safety compliance compared to just culture; whereas, punitive error management and
event severity was unrelated to safety compliance. Given that the behavioral intention
variables were not examined using a single MANCOVA, prior analyses had not assessed
the effect of study covariates simultaneously. Therefore, study covariates were included
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in the regression procedure in step one. A significant association was found between
blameless error management (EM2) and safety compliance (p = .038).

Table 14
Regression analysis for error management and event severity on safety compliance
intentions
β

S.E.

p

COMP

<---

EM1

-.220

.132

.097

COMP

<---

EM2

-.267

.128

.038*

COMP

<---

Harm

.018

.107

.864.

COMP

<---

Gender

-.158

.163

.333

COMP

<---

Age

-.003

.009

.764

COMP

<---

Error as patient

-.196

.207

.346

COMP

<---

Error as provider

-.220

.140

.119

COMP

<---

Familiarity with JC

-.015

.046

.750

When organizational justice and organizational trust were added to the model,
justice was associated with significant increase in safety compliance (p =.008), but
blameless error management was no longer significant (p =.178). Thus, this is evidence
of complete mediation of the association between difference between blameless and just
error management and safety compliance by organizational justice. Table 15 depicts this
information.
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Table 15
Regression analysis for error management and event severity on safety compliance
intentions, controlling for perception mediators
Estimate

S.E.

P

COMP <---

EM1

-.058

.133

.605.

COMP <---

EM2

-.172

.127

.178.

COMP <---

Harm

-.007

.104

.931.

COMP <---

Gender

-.235

.158

.139

COMP <---

Age

-.003

.009

.732

COMP <---

Error as patient

-.148

.200

.459

COMP <---

Error as provider

-.160

.136

.239

COMP <---

Familiarity with JC

-.025

.044

.578

COMP <---

OJ

.140

.052

.008*

COMP <---

OT

.061

.089

.539.

Error reporting was regressed onto error management conditions (dummy coded
categorical variable) and event severity. The first requirement for testing mediation is to
establish a relationship between the predictor(s) and outcome variables. In a stepwise
fashion, all independent variables were entered into the regression analysis, followed by
the mediator variables of organizational justice and organizational trust added
simultaneously. Study covariates were included in the procedure due to the associations
found in the between-subjects analysis for error reporting. Results indicate no significant
association between error management or event severity; but did find significant
association between experience with error as a provider (β =-1.122, p =.002) and
familiarity with just culture (β =.245, p =.034). However, there was no significant
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association between error management and event reporting, thus no relationship to
mediate. Table 16 depicts this.

Table 16
Regression analysis for error management and event severity on error reporting
intentions
Estimate

S.E.

p

ER

<---

EM1

-.159

.334

.635

ER

<---

EM2

.047

.323

.884

ER

<---

Harm

.258

.268

.336

ER

<---

Error as provider

-1.122

.350

.002*

ER

<---

Familiar with JC

.245

.115

.034*

Regression analysis were also conducted to examine the associations between all
covariates on organizational perceptions (Tables 17). None of the covariates were
significant predictors of the organizational perception variables (p ≤ .163).

Table 17
Regression analysis for covariates on perceived organizational justice and organizational
trust
Estimate

S.E.

p

OJ

<---

Age

-.001

.017

.965

OJ

<---

Gender

-.404

.289

.163

OJ

<---

Familiarity with JC

.091

.080

.255

OJ

<---

Error as provider

-.182

.245

.459

OJ

<---

Error as patient

-.413

.363

.257

OT

<---

Age

.010

.010

.291
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Table 17 Continued
Estimate

S.E.

p

OT

<---

Gender

.208

.167

.214

OT

<---

Familiarity with JC

.051

.046

.271

OT

<---

Error as provider

-.116

.210

.582

OT

<---

Error as patient

-.138

.142

.330

Path Analysis
Path analysis was conducted to evaluate the overall just culture mediation model
and confirm specific mediation pathways specified within. Given findings from the
MANOVA and regression analyses, all covariates were excluded from the path models
for the work-focused attitudinal outcomes; and only error as a provider and familiarity
with just culture were included in path models for the individual-focused behavioral
intention models.
Attitudinal model. All attitudinal path models were performed using Maximum
Likelihood (ML) estimation. Prior to estimation, cross-group equivalency tests were
conducted to assess the structural invariance among the primary study variables across all
three error management conditions. Results suggest that constrained models did not
significantly improve when constraints were removed [ꭓ2 difference test (8) = 12.913, p =
.11], indicating a combined sample for the primary study analysis is appropriate. Details
of the multi-group analysis are in the Appendix C. Next, event severity and error
management (dummy-codes for punitive and blameless approaches) variables were added
to the model as exogenous variables. A partial mediation model was examined where the
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direct effects of error management were not constrained to zero. Next, a fully mediated
work-attitudes path model was performed which constrained the direct paths from error
management conditions to outcomes at zero. Model fit was not significantly reduced (i.e.,
ꭓ2(4) = 7.128, p =.13), therefore, the more parsimonious fully mediated model was
retained. Details of the partial mediation model are reported in Appendix C. Goodness of
fit statistics revealed an acceptable model fit for the fully mediated model, [ꭓ2 (6) =
7.551, p = .27, CFI = 1.00, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .09], SRMR = .02].
Examination of the parameter estimates revealed positive associations between
organizational justice and trust with organizational commitment (OJ: β =.438 (.041), p <
.001; OT: β =.512 (.072), p < .001) and attraction (OJ: β =.276 (.042), p < .001; OT: β
=.619 (.073), p < .001). Furthermore, negative associations between punitive and
blameless conditions and organizational justice (Punitive: β = -.925 (.215), p < .001;
Blameless: β =-.507 (.206), p = .014) and organizational trust (Punitive: β = -.351 (.123),
p = .004; Blameless: β =-.390 (.118), p = .001) suggest that each error management
condition was associated with significant reductions in perceptions of justice and
trustworthiness compared to just culture.
Indirect effects indicate the differences in attraction between punitive and just
culture were due to significant paths through both organizational trust (β = -.217 (.081), p
=.007) and justice (β= -.255 (.071), p <.001). Similarly, the differences in attraction
between blameless and just culture was due to significant paths through both
organizational trust (β = -.241 (.079), p =.002) and justice (β= -.140 (.061), p =.021).
The difference in commitment between punitive and just culture was due to significant
paths through both organizational trust (β =-.180 (.068), p =.008) and justice (β =-.405
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(.101), p < .001). The difference in commitment between blameless and just culture was
due to significant paths through both organizational trust (β = -.200 (.067), p =.003) and
justice (β =-.222 (.092), p =.016). No effects were found for event severity on either
organizational trust (β =.099 (.062), p =.108) or justice (β =.039 (.061), p =.522).

Figure 9. Organizational-Focused Attitudes Full Mediation Path Model
Behavioral intention model. All behavioral intention path models were performed
using Maximum Likelihood “Robust” (MLR), which is robust to non-normality and nonindependence of observations (provides robust standard errors). First, cross-group
equivalency tests were conducted to assess the structural invariance among the perception
and behavioral intention variables across all three error management conditions. Results
suggest that the model did not significantly improve when cross-group constraints were
removed [Satorra-Bentler scaled ꭓ2 diff (4) = 1.118, p = .89], indicating a combined
sample for the primary study analysis is appropriate. Details of this analysis can be found
in Appendix C.
First, a partial mediation model was examined where the direct effects of error
management on behavioral intentions were estimated. Error management (dummy-codes
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for punitive and blameless approaches), event severity, and relevant study covariates
(familiarity with just culture and error as a provider, due to their significant associations
in prior analyses) were added to the model as exogenous variables with direct effects on
error reporting, [ꭓ2 (8) = 7.564, p = .48 (Scaling Correction Factor for MLR=1.0225), CFI
= 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .07], SRMR = .03]. Next, the direct
effects of error management on behavior intentions were constrained to zero producing a
full mediation model with acceptable goodness of fit, [ꭓ2 (12) = 12.426, p = .41 (Scaling
Correction Factor for MLR=1.0081, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .01, 90% CI [.00,
.07], SRMR = .03]. Model fit did not significantly worsen by including the constraints
(Satorra-Bentler scaled ꭓ2 difference test (4) = 4.77, p =.31). Thus, the more
parsimonious fully mediated model was retained. Details of the partial mediation model
are in the Appendix C. Examination of the parameter estimates revealed negative
associations between punitive and blameless conditions and organizational justice
(Punitive: β =-.507 (.203), p = .012; Blameless: β = -.925 (.216), p ≤ .001) and
organizational trust (Punitive: β = -.351 (.127), p = .006; Blameless: β =-.390 (.118), p =
.001). Organizational justice was positively associated with safety compliance (β =.145
(.060), p = .015) but not error reporting (β =.229 (.144), p = .113). The difference in
blameless and just culture error management on safety compliance was due to the indirect
effects of organizational justice (β =-.134 (.067), p = .046). No such indirect effects were
found for punitive error management (β =-.074 (.045), p = .103). Organizational trust
was not associated with either behavioral intention outcome (Compliance: β =.067 (.096),
p < .486; Error reporting: β =-.237 (.233), p < .309).
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Figure 10. Individual-Focused Full Mediation Path Model

Table 18
Overview of path model fit statistics
ꭓ2

df

Partial Mediation

.423

2

Full Mediation

7.551

6

Partial Mediation

7.564

8

Full Mediation

12.426 12

ꭓ2 diff

Δdf

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

SRMR

.00

1.00

1.00

.01

.03

1.00

.99

.02

.00

1.00

1.00

.03

.01

1.00

1.00

.03

Attitudes

7.128

4

Behaviors

4.89

4

Moderation tests. Finally, to test for the moderating effect of event severity,
multigroup event severity analyses were conducted constraining the associations between
error management and organizational perceptions to be equal. Multigroup analyses are
recommended to test for categorical moderation variables (Muthén & Muthén, 2017),
where specific parameters are constrained across groups to be equal. The fit of the
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complete mediation attitudinal model without parameters constrained did not
significantly improve with constraints added [ꭓ2 diff (4) = 1.142, p = .89]. Similarly, the
fit of the complete mediation behavior model without parameters constrained was not
significantly improved with constraints added [Satorra-Bentler scaled ꭓ2 diff (4) = 1.118,
p = .89; Table 19].

Table 19
Overview of multi-group severity fit statistics and model comparison
ꭓ2

df

ꭓ2 diff

Δdf

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

SRMR

.08

.99

.97

.03

.05

1.00

.99

.04

.00

1.00

1.00

.04

.00

1.00

1.00

.04

Attitudes
Not constrained 14.492 8
Constrained

15.634 12

1.142

4

Behaviors
Not constrained 18.054 20
Constrained

19.155 24

4.89

4

Furthermore, interaction terms were regressed onto the perceptions (justice and
trust): no significant direct effect on either perception (p’s >.544), and the interaction
terms were significant (p’s > .453; Table 20).
Table 20
Regression analysis of error management and event severity interaction terms on
organizational perceptions
Estimate

S.E.

p

OJ

<---

EM1

-1.304

.284

<.001*

OT

<---

EM1

-.525

.167

.002*
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Table 20 Continued
Estimate

S.E.

p

OJ

<---

EM2

-.896

.284

.002*

OT

<---

EM2

-.621

.167

<.001*

OJ

<---

Harm1

.050

.294

.864

OT

<---

Harm1

.105

.173

.544

OJ

<---

Harm_X_EM1

-.086

.410

.833

OT

<---

Harm_X_EM1

-.036

.242

.883

OJ

<---

Harm_X_EM2

.205

.399

.607

OT

<---

Harm_X_EM2

.176

.235

.453
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Chapter 5
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the theory of Just Culture, which states
that employees will experience optimal organizational and safety-related outcomes under
error management circumstances that are perceived as trustworthy and fair. The findings
largely provide empirical support for the theory of Just Culture. Just culture error
management showed significant increases over other error management methods in
perceptions of organizational justice and organizational trust, intention to perform safety
compliance behaviors, and work-related attitudes of commitment and attraction.
Furthermore, significant evidence of mediation of the primary relationships by
organizational justice and/or organizational trust was obtained. Yet, some findings were
surprising. Event severity was not found to impact any of the organizational perceptions,
attitudes, or safety-critical behaviors directly; nor did event severity moderate the
association between error management and organizational perceptions. Additionally, the
hypothesis that just culture would improve willingness to engage in error reporting
behavior was not supported. In fact, no difference was found in willingness to report
errors across all error management approaches. This is an outlier in the known literature
on error reporting behavior, and will be discussed in detail in this chapter.
Overall, this study moves the just culture literature forward in several key
ways—by examining several underlying (untested) assumptions of the just culture model
from an empirical perspective, positioning these assumptions in established
organizational theory, and providing support for most of these assumptions through
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thorough rigorous analysis. The following section provides a brief summary and
interpretation of all study hypotheses and findings.
Perceptions of organizations resulting from error management. The analyses
found support for the position that error management strategy impacts how organizations
are viewed, globally, in terms of fairness and trustworthiness (Hypothesis 1, 2). As
expected, the finding suggests that participants perceived organizations that utilized just
culture principles to have higher degrees of fairness (Hypothesis 1) and higher
organizational trust (Hypothesis 2) compared to both blameless and punitive approaches.
This was true regardless of the severity of the event: for instance, even when the patient
was harmed significantly by an error, individuals perceived organizations that utilized
harsh punitive measures as being less fair. Similarly, when the patient was not harmed by
the error, a completely blameless approach to the individual worker was also seen as
unfair compared to just approach. Trustworthiness is, closely linked to displays of justice
(Colquitt et al., 2001), and as such, it is not surprising that these relationships covary.
Likewise, the strengths of these relationships did not differ by event severity: punitive or
blameless responses to both severe and not severe events were seen as less trustworthy
than just culture responses. Participant demographics, error experiences, and familiarity
with just culture had no effect on the overall perceptions of justice and trust.
The patterns that emerged within the organizational perceptions are of interest,
though not directly implicated by the hypotheses. For instance, perceptions of
organizational justice and trust did not differ in punitive compared to blameless error
management, suggesting that participants found both punitive and blameless error
management to be similarly “unjust” compared to just culture. Punitive and blameless
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error management can be considered opposites in many ways; however, both approaches
share an inflexible reaction to errors that differentiate them from just culture (where a
flexible response to errors is a central feature). Inflexibility, and the inability to take event
details into account in the application of interventions would unsurprisingly yield unfair
results and associated perceptions of unfairness. In the case of blameless error
management, the inflexibility is wielded in such a way as to benefit the individual worker
who committed the error; the focus is instead on the system. Punitive error management,
however, inflexibly punishes the individual within the system and ignores the impact of
the system. Although these findings suggest that either approach – whether it benefits the
individual or not – is seen as significantly less fair or trustworthy to a flexible response,
the difference between punitive and blameless error management trended towards
significance (p = .064) such that punitive error management may pose a greater violation
of sense of fairness.
Similarly, organizational trust did not differ between punitive and blameless error
management (both were significantly reduced compared to just culture). However, unlike
with organization justice, the differences between the just culture and other error
management approaches were much more conclusive. Taken together, these findings
suggest that blameless error management “took a hit” when it came to trustworthiness,
despite faring better in perceived organizational justice. Although these two variables
tend to covary, some research suggests that trust is also derived from perceptions of
overall safety (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2008). It may be that in systems that utilize either
punitive or blameless approaches, a sense that the real root causes of errors will go
uncorrected may further deteriorate trust by undermining the sense that overall safety is
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prioritized or competently managed. Overall, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were strongly
supported by this research.
Attitudes about the organization resulting from error management. The analyses
found support for the proposition that error management strategies impact how
individuals feel, globally, towards organizations in terms of attraction and commitment
(Hypothesis 3, 4); and that these feelings are driven (at least in part) by perceptions of
justice and trust (Hypothesis 7). Event severity, participant demographics, error
experiences, and familiarity with just culture had no effect on feelings of attraction and
commitment participants reported. Analyses also revealed that, after controlling for
justice and trust, a significant difference in organizational commitment between just
culture and punitive error management remained. This suggests that employees feel less
committed to punitive hospitals for reasons beyond their justice and trust perceptions.
These findings strongly support the robust literature findings associated with positive
psychosocial outcomes for organizational justice and trust, and provide empirical
evidence in support of the preposition that an error management approach may influence
those perceptions.
Several interesting patterns emerged within the organizational attitude findings,
though not directly implicated by study hypotheses. For instance, punitive and blameless
hospitals were similarly viewed as unattractive workplaces, but punitive hospitals
engendered significantly lower feelings of commitment compared to blameless hospitals.
At first, it may be surprising that blameless hospitals were not considered attractive
workplaces to participants, given the willingness of blameless organizations to withhold
punishments for an individual’s safety errors. In fact, SET argues that pro-social
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organizational behavior towards employees will result in reciprocal pro-social feelings
and behaviors towards the organization. However, these findings suggest some
skepticism is warranted to the concept that a lack of punishment in all cases is, in fact,
pro-social; and that rather, sometimes punishment may be warranted. Although blameless
error management is seen as a “low risk” to an individual for receiving punishment, our
findings show that the reduction in the sense of justice and trust that accompany
blameless error management accounts for the drop in attraction towards blameless
organizations. Stated differently, blameless error management is not pro-social in the
ways that matter for workplace attraction; as it fails to indicate fairness and
trustworthiness.
Although punitive and blameless hospitals were not different on organizational
attraction, punitive error management did inspire significantly less commitment than
blameless error management (which was also, significantly lower in commitment than
just culture). Low levels of commitment towards blameless and punitive hospitals suggest
that these error management approaches are not seen as net positives for the individual.
Whereas the reduction in blameless error management compared to just culture was due
entirely to reduced justice and trust perceptions; even after accounting for justice and
trust, punitive management was still significantly lower in commitment than just culture.
This additional low level of commitment may be in retaliation for the low levels of
commitment the organization expresses towards the individual worker through a
discipline-focused approach to safety. Overall, Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 were supported by
this research.
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Safety-critical behaviors resulting from error management. The analyses found
partial support for the proposition that error management strategies impact willingness to
engage in the safety-critical behaviors of safety compliance and error reporting
(Hypothesis 5, 6), and that differences in behavioral intentions were the result of
organizational perceptions (Hypothesis 8). Specifically, intention to engage in safety
compliance increased in just culture compared to blameless culture, and this increase was
the result of perceptions of organizational justice. No differences were found between
just culture and punitive culture in terms of safety compliance; or between any error
management condition in terms of error reporting. Overall, participant demographics,
error experiences, and familiarity with just culture had no effect on willingness to engage
in safety compliance behaviors. However, prior experience with errors as a provider and
familiarity with just culture were significantly associated with error reporting.
Several findings were surprising. First, participants were equally likely to engage
in safety compliance behaviors in punitive and just culture hospitals and were least likely
to do so in a blameless hospital. The difference between blameless and just culture was
driven entirely by perceptions of justice, suggesting that the lack of justice associated
with blameless error management reduces the sense of accountability individuals
perceive for safety compliance behaviors. Proponents of the punitive approach to error
management have long suggested that accountability is critical for safety; and this
assertion is support by the current study. However, it is important to note that just culture
– which purposefully balances personal accountability with system accountability – did
not differ from a purely punitive approach. Stated differently: an organization appears not
to lose anything with respect to an individual’s sense of accountability towards safety
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behaviors when going from punitive to just culture. This is an important finding, as it
suggests that the main benefit of punitive error management (increased accountability)
can be accomplished via Just Culture, but without the myriad of negative outcomes that
result from this disciplinary approach.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that error reporting behavior was unrelated
to error management condition, especially given the real-world correlational (nonempirical) studies showing improvements in error reporting following just culture
interventions. Several reasons may account for this unexpected result. One interpretation
is that error management truly has no impact on error reporting behaviors, as described
above. Although several correlational studies have found that the implementation of just
culture is associated with improved error reporting rates, it is not possible to identify the
exact cause of this ensuing increase. Correlational studies are often unable to distinguish
spurious associations from true relationships; for instance, perhaps increases in error
reporting is the result of unstudied factors (periods of time of higher patient acuity,
reduced nursing staffing, process or procedural changes, etc.) that periodically impacts
medical fields and disrupt otherwise stable conditions. In the current study, results
suggested that familiarity with just culture concepts may be a confounding (unaccounted
for) variable that explains increases in error reporting. For instance, a large-scale
implementation of just culture error management likely increases familiarity with the
concepts of just culture among staff, especially as staff members come into contact with
the new error management procedures. Subsequent increases in error reporting may be
credited to the just culture error management techniques, but, according to these results,
may be explained (at least partially) by this familiarity instead.
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Another interpretation for the lack of relationship between error reporting and
error management may be that the design of the current study masked a relationship that
was, in fact, actually present. In this study, willingness to engage in error reporting was
measured through self-report, and participants indicated a strong bias to report their
patient safety errors across all conditions. Reliance on self-report may introduce social
desirability bias (Edwards, 1957), where participants report behaviors that they believe
are expected or may be desired by the researcher. Nursing students are likely to perceive
error reporting as socially desirable behavior, and may even be primed by the patient
event vignette to consider the importance of identifying opportunities for errors through
robust reporting. Of note, safety compliance intention was also assessed via self-report
and was also implicated within the error vignette (the nurse failed to follow a required
procedure).
Perhaps a more likely issue is that the sample of nursing students may not have
had enough professional experience to accurately assess their error reporting behavior
intention under hypothetical scenarios. A significant proportion of the study sample
(81.4%) had yet to experience an error while providing care, and therefore, likely did not
have any personal experience reporting a patient safety error in a professional context. As
a result, it may be difficult to truly understand the psychological trauma that can result
from errors, as well as the professional anxiety that may arise when contemplating the
choice to voluntary report. Considering their lack of experience with error reporting, it
may be that the study sample was ill-equipped to accurately assess their reporting
intentions under various error management scenarios. Without some personal experience
as a reference point from which to judge their baseline likelihood towards error reporting,
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it is possible that self-serving biases were activated with the survey questions wherein
students adopted overly “rosy” expectations for their future professional behavior. On the
other hand, the study did find significant variation among safety compliance outcomes
across error management conditions. Unlike error reporting, most students will have had
some degree of experience with safety compliance-related tasks (following a procedure,
for instance) in their practicums and therefore, have a personal baseline reference from
which to adjust their intentions given the hypothetical scenarios presented within this
study. Overall, this somewhat surprising finding points out the need to more fully explore
the associations between error management and error reporting in future investigations;
an experimental design that does not rely on a self-report measure is suggested, but rather
actively tracks error reporting behavior in samples exposed to just culture error
management and attempts to comprehensively control for other possible extraneous
factors.
Control variables. Several control variables were analyzed in this study, including
demographics (gender, age), prior experiences with errors (as a patient or provider), and
familiarity with just culture, and event severity. Control variables were not found to have
significant associations with perceptions of justice or trust, organizational attraction,
organizational commitment, or willingness to engage in safety compliance. Furthermore,
organizational perceptions were not influenced by event severity condition either directly,
or through moderation effects. Such results suggest that three is an intuitive fairness and
trustworthiness associated with just culture error management: it was apparent for naïve
as well as familiar students, was not impacted by previous experiences with errors, had
broad support across all ages and genders; and was not diminished by patient outcomes.
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For organizations implementing just culture principles, these findings suggest that
communication about and implementation of just culture does not have to be nuanced for
different groups and can be broadly applicable for many types of providers. Furthermore,
workers of all types are likely to have similar perceptions of just, blameless, and punitive
error management. However, the significant differences for intentions for error reporting
behavior across those with previous errors as providers do pose some problems for
organizations. Participants in this study were students; and it appears that some have
already internalized a negative association with error reporting following an incident as a
healthcare provider. Involvement in an error as a provider can be both personally and
professionally traumatic. Whether this reluctance to report is a direct result of being
involved in an event itself or due to some a negative outcome the nurse experienced after
his or her error is unclear. This finding highlights the importance of providing some level
of coaching and support to all error reporters to help them gain a sense of the important
value of reporting errors as a safety-improvement effort.
Future directions
This study adds significantly to the nascent literature on error management in
healthcare settings. Although the results of this study provide solid empirical support for
several just culture hypotheses, some inherent limitations should be acknowledged. For
many reasons, it was impractical to examine how workers respond to error management
using an empirical between-subjects methodology in a real-world hospital setting. As a
proxy, vignettes were used to simulate a work-environment and participants were asked
to project their perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral choices into that simulation.
Naturally, this proxy is not exact and raises some concerns with respect to validity.

98

However, having students read vignettes in this way allows tighter control of the
experimental conditions that otherwise would be contaminated with measurement error
and confounding variables. Projecting onto a simulation forces participants to respond to
the details of the simulation itself. In contrast, asking participants to rate their actual
commitment to their actual organization is likely to be contaminated by extraneous
variables of little interest to the current project (i.e., relationship with their colleagues,
pay equity, benefits, biases, etc.). Further, asking participants to quantify the degree of
just culture expressed at their organization (rather than tightly controlling these
conditions through vignettes) would likely have failed to answer a key question of this
research: is just culture perceived as just? However, based on the current findings, a next
logical step would be to extend this theoretical model into an actual work environment by
replicating this work using a sample of working nurses, or by surveying working nurses
following their involvement with error management interventions. Such studies could
also assess associations between perceptions of error management and additional
outcomes of interest, such as voluntary turnover and safety citizenship behaviors.
Nursing students were targeted for this research study due to their content and
context knowledge of the circumstances described within the event vignettes, as well as
their lack of allegiance to a specific organization and likely interest in pursuing a
healthcare work environment in the future. However, such methodological choices do not
come without their disadvantages. The findings of this study may not be generalizable to
student nurses at other universities or to working nurses. Importantly, only students who
had some work-like practicum experience were chosen for the study. These experiences
were important for two reasons: (1) first-hand knowledge about how nursing work is
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truly done and the circumstances that lead to unintentional error was vital to the relevance
of the vignette, and (2) each student has been shaped by unique experiences outside of
their nursing program, creating a more diverse sample population. As a result, findings
from this study likely have greater generalizability than would a study that focused on
lesser experienced students.
Future studies may further extend these findings by applying this experimental
vignette approach to other types of errors. The current study examined an at-risk behavior
involving a failure to follow a procedural rule – because it most forcefully and
straightforwardly distinguished between the three error management strategies. Although
choosing a single at-risk event was appropriate and necessary for the current study, it is
possible that other scenarios might have elicited different responses from participants.
For instance, the just culture algorithms specify handling of repetitive errors by
evaluating the presence of system and personal performance shaping factors in
dichotomous terms (i.e., these factors either are or are not present). However, in most
real-world applications, it is likely that both system and personal factors will be present
to some degree. From an application perspective, this raises certain questions such as:
how weak can these factors be before they can be discounted in the error management
response and still retain a sense of fairness and equity? Furthermore, are their specific
types of system performance shaping factors (for instance, organizational safety culture)
that are perceived to be less relevant compared to others (managerial priorities and
decisions, or poor system design) when forming a fair response to errors. These
questions, and more, are the realm of future studies.
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Finally, the degree to which any vignette is truly representative of any error
management strategy may be debated. In this case, subject matter experts provided
guidance in the development of the vignettes and rated their acceptability as an
illustration of each error management strategy. However, other experts, not consulted for
this study, may find objections to some components of the vignette language or content.
Future studies may abandon the vignette-based approach for this reason, or may extend
and replicate these findings with different true to life error management examples.

Conclusions
For organizations implementing error management techniques, these findings
suggest that the most important consideration is the dutifulness to which justice and
trustworthiness are maintained towards individuals in the aftermath of event involvement.
If providers experience the application of error management to be fair and trustworthy,
they are more likely to behave safely and feel attracted and committed to the
organization. Importantly, this study also suggests that some allegiance to the just culture
algorithms readily available in the literature will likely serve the organization well in
terms of justice and trust perceptions. A flexible approach that considers influential
systemic factors while reinforcing performance expectations appears to be the best way to
elicit perceptions of fairness and trustworthiness. Error management that ignores
performance expectations reduces organizational attraction and safety compliance
intentions; whereas, error management that fails to consider systemic factors decreases
organizational attraction and commitment.
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This study moves the just culture literature forward in several key ways: by
examining several underlying (previously untested) assumptions of the just culture model
from an empirical perspective, positioning these assumptions in established
organizational theory, and submitting support for most of these assumptions through
thorough analysis. The findings of this study provide empirical support for just culture
mediation model, highlighting the importance of organizational trust and perceived
organizational justice in fully mediating the association between error management and
psychosocial and behavioral intention outcomes. This analysis models associations from
explicitly stated organizational responses to specific safety events to explain variance
among individuals in terms of these key psychosocial and behavioral intention outcomes.
Furthermore, this study was able to reject personal demographics of age and gender, prior
experiences with errors as a patient or provider, and familiarity with just culture construct
as predictors in how individuals perceive or react to error management practices in terms
of attraction, commitment, and safety compliance intention. Finally, this study did not
find support for the proposition that error reporting increased under just culture error
management. Rather, results suggested that familiarity with just culture concepts may
(partially) account for real-world positive associations between just culture
implementation and error reporting.
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Appendix A1
Punitive Error Management, Severe Harm Condition
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Appendix A2
Error Vignette: Blameless EM + Severe Harm
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Appendix A3
Error Vignette: Just Culture EM + Severe Harm
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Appendix A4
Error Vignette: Punitive EM + No Harm
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Appendix A5
Error Vignette: Blameless EM + No Harm
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Appendix A6
Error Vignette: Just Culture EM + No Harm

128

129

Appendix B1
Manipulation Check
1. In the scenario, did the nurse follow the steps of the blood labeling policy?
a. Yes
b. No
2. In the scenario, what was the outcome for the patient?
a. The patient was not harmed
b. The patient experienced a harm event, but was effectively treated
c. The patient experienced a harm event and did not survive
3. In the scenario, who did the hospital determine was the responsible for the event?
a. Determined the nurse was responsible
b. Determined management was responsible
c. Determined both the nurse and management were responsible
d. Determined neither the nurse nor management was responsible
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Appendix B2
Organizational Attractiveness items
1. I feel I would fit in this organization.
2. I would feel at home working for an organization like this.
3. I would very much like to work for this organization.
4. This organization will likely meet my desires and needs.
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Appendix B3
Organizational Trust items
1. I am not sure I fully trust this employer.
2. This employer will be open and upfront with me.
3. I believe this employer has high integrity.
4. In general, I believe this employer’s motives and intentions are good.
5. This employer is not always honest and truthful.
6. I can expect this employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion.
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Appendix B4
Perceived Organizational Justice items
1. Overall, I’m treated fairly by this organization.
2. In general, I can count on this organization to be fair.
3. In general, the treatment I receive around here is fair.
4. Usually, the way things work in this organization are not fair.
5. For the most part, this organization treats its employees fairly.
6. Most of the people who work here would say they are often treated unfairly.
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Appendix B5
Organizational Commitment items
1. I would be willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in
order to help this hospital be successful.
2. I would talk up this organization to my friends as a great company to work for.
3. I would feel very little loyalty to this organization.
4. I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for
this organization.
5. I find that my values and the organization’s values are very similar.
6. I would be proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.
7. I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of
work were similar.
8. This organization would really inspire the very best in me in the way of job
performance.
9. It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave
this organization.
10. I would be extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over others.
11. There’s not too much to be gained by sticking with this organization indefinitely.
12. Often I find it difficult to agree with this organization’s policies on important
matters relating to its employees.
13. I really care about the fate of this organization.
14. For me this is the best of all possible organizations for which to work.
15. Deciding to work for this organization would be a definite mistake on my part.
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Appendix B6
Safety Compliance items
1. Overlook safety procedures in order to get my job done more quickly.
2. Follow all safety procedures regardless of the situation I am in.
3. Handle all situations as if there is a possibility of having an accident.
4. Wear safety equipment required by practice.
5. Keep my work area clean.
6. Encourage coworkers to be safe.
7. Keep my work equipment in safe working condition.
8. Take shortcuts to safe working behaviors in order to get the job done faster.
9. Follow safety rules even if I think they are unnecessary.
10. Report safety problems to my supervisor when I see safety problems.
11. Correct safety problems to ensure accidents will not occur.
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Appendix B7
Error Reporting items
1. If I committed an error that had no adverse effect on patients, I would report the
error to the organization.
2. If my colleague committed an error with no adverse effect on patients, I would
report the error to the organization.
3. I would share information regarding errors or malpractice with the organization.
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Appendix B8
Demographic Questionnaire
Gender (circle one)

Male

Female

Other

Age: ___________
Number of years in Nursing Program: _________

1. Have you ever been harmed by an error while receiving medical care?
Yes

No

2. Have you ever made an error while delivering medical care?
Yes

No

3. How familiar are you with the concept of Just Culture?
Extremely
familiar

Moderately
familiar

Neutral

Slightly
familiar

Not at all familiar

4. Have you heard the news about a recent incident at Vanderbilt, where a
nurse’s medication error resulted in a patient death?
Yes

No

5. How familiar are you with the specifics of the Vanderbilt case, and the
outcome for the nurse involved in this incident?
Extremely
familiar

Moderately
familiar

Neutral

Slightly
familiar

Not at all familiar

6. Based on your knowledge of the event, do you agree with the approach
Vanderbilt took in handing the nurse involved in the incident?
Yes – I agree with
the approach

No – I don’t agree
with the approach

Not familiar
enough to make a
judgement

7. How concerned are you about the precedent set by the Vanderbilt case for
your chosen career?
Extremely
concerned

Moderately
concerned

Neutral
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Slightly
concerned

Not at all
concerned

Not
familiar
enough
with case
to make a
judgement

Appendix C1
Multi-group Error Management Models
Cross-group equality tests were conducted to assess the degree to which study
mediators were similarly associated with attitudinal and behavioral intention outcomes
across the three error management conditions. In the multi-group analyses, the primary
study path coefficients were constrained to be equal, allowing for comparisons of model
fit to test the degree to which the model maintains overall goodness of fit.
The attitudinal model included organizational justice, organizational trust, and
event severity as exogenous variables and allowed to covary. Event severity was kept in
the model, producing an over-identified variance-covariance matrix that would render
goodness of fit statistics. The fit of the attitudinal model with parameters constrained [ꭓ2
(14) = 19.124, p = .16, CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.00, .13], SRMR =
.06] did not significantly improve with constraints removed constrained [ꭓ2 (6) = 6.211, p
= .4, CFI = 1.00, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .02, 90% CI [.00, .14], SRMR = .02; ꭓ2 diff (8) =
12.91, p = .11]. The primary associations between perceptions and organizational
attitudes did not differ across error management conditions.
Similarly, in the behavioral intentions model, organizational justice,
organizational trust, familiarity with just culture were identified as exogenous variables
and allowed to covary; intentions for error reporting and safety compliance were
exogenous. The primary paths between study variables were constrained to zero
producing acceptable fit, [ꭓ2 (26) = 28.110, p = .35 (Scaling Correction Factor for
MLR=1.0465), CFI = .97, TLI = .97, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .10], SRMR = .07]. .
The fit of the behavioral model with parameters constrained did not significantly improve
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with constraints removed [ꭓ2 (18) = 19.058, p = .38 (Scaling Correction Factor for
MLR=.9779), CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .10], SRMR = .06;
Satorra-Bentler scaled ꭓ2 diff (8) = 8.977, p = .34], suggesting that across error
management groups, perceptions had similar effects on outcome variables. These
findings are summarized in Table 21.

Table 21
Overview of multi-group error management fit statistics and model comparison
ꭓ2

df

Constrained

19.124

14

Not constrained

6.211

6

Constrained

28.110

26

Not constrained

19.058

18

ꭓ2 diff

Δdf

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

SRMR

.07

.99

.98

.06

.02

1.00

.99

.03

.03

.97

.97

.07

.03

.99

.98

.06

Attitudes

12.913

8

Behaviors

8.977
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Appendix C2
Alternative models
Attitudes. Analysis suggested acceptable model fit for the partial mediation
attitudes model, [ꭓ2 (2) = .423, p = .81, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI
[.00, .07], SRMR = .01]. Similar to the previous analysis, direct path coefficients suggest
that justice and trust had significant associations with commitment (OJ: β =.413 (.042), p
< .001; OT: β =.530 (.072), p < .001) and attraction (OJ: β =.269 (.043), p < .001; OT: β
=.623 (.074), p < .001). Neither punitive nor blameless error management had direct
effects on attraction (Punitive: β =-.071 (.109), p = .518; Blameless: β =-.009 (.104), p =
.931).
The differences in attraction between punitive and just culture was due to
significant paths through both organizational trust (β = -.219 (.081), p =.007) and justice
(β = -.249 (.070), p < .001). Similarly, the differences in attraction between blameless
and just culture was due to significant paths through both organizational trust (β = -.243
(.079), p =.002) and justice (β = -.136 (.060), p =.022). The difference in commitment
between punitive and just culture was due to significant paths through both organizational
trust (β =-.186 (.070), p =.008) and justice (β =-.382 (.097), p < .001); but also due to a
significant direct path to commitment (β =-.243 (.107), p =.023). However, the
difference in commitment between blameless and just culture was due to significant paths
through both organizational trust (β = -.206 (.069), p =.003) and justice (β =-.209 (.088),
p =.017), but blameless error management showed no significant direct effect on
commitment (β=.001 (.101), p < .990). Finally, event severity was not directly associated
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with either organizational justice (β = .109 (.171), p =.522). or trust (β = .157 (.098), p
=.110).

Figure 11. Organizational-Focused Attitudes Partial Mediation Path Model

Behavior intentions. Analysis suggested acceptable goodness of fit for the partial
mediation behavioral intention model, [ꭓ2 (6) = 7.564, p = .44 (Scaling Correction Factor
for MLR=.977), CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .08], SRMR = .02].
Examination of the parameter estimates revealed a direct effect of blameless error
management with compliance explained some of the remaining variance between
blameless and just culture error management (β = -.199 (.112), p = .050). All other
significant associations remained substantially unchanged from the prior model: negative
associations between punitive and blameless conditions and organizational justice
(Punitive: β = -.925 (.216), p < .001; Blameless: β =-.507 (.203), p = .012) and
organizational trust (Punitive: β = -.351 (.127), p = .006; Blameless: β =-.390 (.118), p =
.001); as well as, positive associations between organizational justice and safety
compliance (OJ: β =.147 (.060), p = .014). The difference in blameless and just culture
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error management on safety compliance was due to the indirect effects of organizational
justice (β =-.136 (.067), p = .043).

Figure 12. Individual-Focused Behavioral Intention Partial Mediation Path Model
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